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Utah Supreme Court 
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Dear Mr. Butler: 
The respondent, State of Utah, hereby waives the right 
to file a Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
in the above-referenced case pursuant to Rule 47(d), Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This waiver does not constitute a 
stipulation that the petition should be granted, but rather, it 
is respondent's position that the petition should be denied based 
upon the legal analysis contained in the Brief of Respondent and 
the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which are attached to 
this letter. In the event that the Court deems an additional 
response by the State necessary to its determination, a Brief in 
Opposition will be provided. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Very truly yours, 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Ralph Tolman, Claude Donald 
Harman, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
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; 
Attorneys: Loni F. DeLand, Scott W. Reed, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff, and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Ralph Tolman (Tolman) appeals from his conviction of 
tampering with a witness, a class A misdemeanor in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1978), and official misconduct, a 
class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 
(1978). Tolman raises numerous issues on appeal, including 
whether: 1) the evidence was sufficient to support the 
convictions; 2) the trial court erred in ruling that Tolman was 
not entitled to a preliminary hearing; 3) the trial court erred 
in admitting a transcript of Tolman's grand jury testimony at 
trial; and 4) the trial court erred in failing to consider 
juror affidavits concerning one juror's alleged divine 
revelation. We affirm the conviction of witness tampering and 
reverse the conviction of official misconduct. 
I. FACTS 
•In setting out the facts from the record on appeal, we 
resolve all conflicts and doubts in favor of the jury's verdict 
and the rulings of the trial court." State v. Babbell, 103 
Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 14 (March 3, 1989). Our statement of the 
facts, therefore, is set forth in conformance with Babbell. 
In May 1983, a fire at the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza in Murray, Utah caused extensive damage to the offices of 
the Salt Lake County mental health department. Dean C. Larsen 
(Larsen), Assistant Chief and Fire Marshall for the Murray City 
Fire Department, investigated the fire and reported that it 
originated in the mental health offices and was caused by 
misuse of a space heater and extension cord. The next day, 
Evan Stephens (Stephens), risk manager for Salt Lake County, 
asked the county attorney's office to investigate the fire. 
Claude Donald Harman (Harman), chief investigator for the 
county attorney's office, assigned Tolman and investigator Olin 
Yearby (Yearby) to assist in determining the cause and origin 
of the fire. Tolman and Yearby met with Larsen at the fire 
scene and investigated the fire. Afterwards, Tolman informed 
Stephens that he agreed with Larsen that the fire originated in 
the county offices. Stephens, who was concerned about the 
county's liability for the fire if it originated in the 
county's offices, wrote a letter to Harman, stating he was 
hiring Jim Ashby (Ashby) of Global Investigations to perform an 
independent investigation of the fire. Shortly thereafter, 
Tolman and Yearby ceased their investigation. In the meantime, 
a laboratory analyzed the extension cord and space heater and 
provided a report which stated that the heater could not have 
caused the fire because it was not energized at the time of the 
fire. On June 6, 1983, Ashby concluded that based on the 
laboratory analysis and his investigation, the fire originated 
in the attic above the county offices. 
On August 1, 1983, Tolman submitted a seven-page report 
on the fire to his supervisor, Sam Dawson. The report 
concluded that the fire originated in the mental health 
department's offices. Dawson rejected the report. At Tolman's 
insistence, Dawson sent the report to Harman. Harman also 
rejected the report and ordered Tolman to prepare another 
report. Contrary to the county attorney's office policy of not 
releasing reports outside the office prior to approval by a 
supervisor, Tolman sent a copy of the seven-page report to 
Larsen. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether Tolman 
sent the report to Larsen before or after Harman rejected it. 
In any event, after Harman rejected the report, Tolman 
contacted Larsen, told him that Harman was angry about the 
contents of the report and asked him to destroy the report. 
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Tolman also informed Larsen that he, Tolman, could get into 
trouble for releasing the report to Larsen. On August 25, 
19Q3, Tolman submitted a one-page report on the fire to Harman, 
which did not include an opinion as to the fire's origin* 
Harman approved and filed the report. 
In 1984, civil litigation regarding the fire was 
initiated. In November 1984, Larsen received a subpoena duces 
tecum requesting him to appear at a deposition with all records 
and documents relating to the fire at the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza. Larsen did not produce Tolman*s seven-page 
report at the deposition because he did not want to cause 
Tolman any problems. Larsen was again deposed in November 1985 
and revealed the existence of Tolman9s seven-page report. 
In 1986, a grand jury was called to investigate possible 
criminal charges related to the alleged cover-up of reports 
regarding the 1983 fire at the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza. On April 9, 1986, Tolman was called to testify before 
the grand jury. Prior to Tolman testifying, special 
prosecutors Rodney Snow and Larry Keller, and grand jury 
investigator Lorin C. Brooks met Tolman outside the grand jury 
room and advised him that he was the subject of the grand jury 
inquiry. Tolman stated that he did not realize he was a 
subject. Snow and Keller then told Tolman that he had the 
right to have counsel present outside the courtroom, that he 
could talk to an attorney before testifying, and that he could 
contact an attorney at any time during his testimony. Tolman 
said he had an attorney and that he was aware of his rights. 
He also stated he was willing to appear, despite the 
prosecutors* offer to postpone his testimony. Tolman then took 
the witness stand, acknowledged that he had a right to counsel, 
and was informed that the investigation concerned the report he 
prepared regarding the fire at the Fashion Pl»ce Professional 
Plaza. About a month later, Tolman was again subpoenaed to 
testify before the grand jury.and informed of'his right to 
counsel. 
On October 9, 1986, the grand jury indicted Tolman for 
tampering with evidence, tampering with a witness, official 
misconduct and criminal conspiracy. Prior to trial, Tolman's 
motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. After a three 
week trial, the jury retired to deliberate. Portions of 
Tolman9s grand jury transcript were permitted to be taken into 
the jury room. The jury convicted Tolman of tampering with a 
witness and official misconduct. This appeal followed. 
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
On appeal, Tolman claims the evidence was insufficient to 
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support his convictions. When reviewing whether evidence is 
sufficient to support a jury conviction, 
we review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
State V, POOker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting fitatfi 
V, Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 
439, 479 (Utah 1988). We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury as it is the "exclusive province of the jury 
to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the 
evidence." Steele v. Brienholt, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Booker. 709 P.2d at 345. 
A. Witness Tampering 
Our first inquiry is whether the evidence was sufficient to 
support Tolman's conviction of tampering with a witness under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1978). Section 76-8-508 states: 
A person is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or 
otherwise cause a person to: 
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, 
document, or thing . . . . 
In order to satisfy the elements of section 76-8-508, the 
prosecution had to demonstrate that: 1) Tolman believed that 
an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to 
be instituted, fififi, e.g., State v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 874, 877 
(Utah 1988) (stating that section 76-8-508 does not require 
proof that an official investigation or proceeding was pending, 
but only that defendant believed such an investigation or 
proceeding was pending); and 2) Tolman knowingly or 
intentionally attempted to induce or otherwise cause another 
person to withhold any testimony, information, document, or 
thing. 
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In this case, Tolman was assigned to investigate the fire 
at the Fashion Place Professional Plaza and met with Yearby and 
Larsen at the scene of the fire to determine its cause. Tolman 
subsequently prepared an investigation report. Based on these 
facts, a juror could reasonably conclude Tolman believed that 
an official investigation was pending. In addition, Larsen 
testified that Tolman instructed him to destroy the report. 
Subsequently, Larsen withheld Tolman9s seven-page report from a 
civil proceeding despite a subpoena duces tecum requiring him 
to produce the report. Larsen testified that he did not 
produce the report because he did not want to cause problems 
for Tolman. Based on that testimony, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that Tolman induced Larsen to withhold the report from 
an official investigation or proceeding. Although contrary 
evidence was presented, w[t]he existence of contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing 
the jury's verdict." lfl. We, therefore, conclude that the 
record contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that Tolman knowingly or intentionally attempted to 
induce Larsen to withhold the seven-page report from an 
official investigation or proceeding. Thus, we affirm Tolman1s 
conviction for witness tampering. 
B. Official Misconduct 
We next consider whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support Tolman's conviction of official misconduct. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-201 (1978) states: 
A public servant is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit 
himself or another or to harm another, he 
knowingly commits an unauthorized act 
which purports to be an act of his office, 
or knowingly refrains from performing a 
duty imposed on him by law or clearly 
inherent in the nature of his office. 
To demonstrate a violation of section 76-8-201, the 
prosecution was required to prove that Tolman: 1) acted in his 
capacity as a public servant; 2) acted with an intent to 
benefit himself or another or to harm another; and 3) knowingly 
committed an unauthorised act which purported to be an act of 
his office or knowingly refrained from performing a duty 
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his 
office. We can find no evidence in the record to establish the 
third element, that Tolman committed an unauthorised act which 
purported to be an act of his office. Although Tolman may have 
committed an unauthorised act by distributing the seven-page 
report to Larsen in violation of office policy, there is no 
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evidence that Tolman's act purported to be an act of his 
office. In fact, Larsen testified that Tolman told him he 
would be in trouble if Harman knew Larsen had received the 
report. In addition, we find no evidence that Tolman knowingly 
refrained from performing a duty imposed by law or inherent in 
the nature of his office. Therefore, because we find no 
evidence in the record to satisfy all elements of section 
76-8-201, we reverse Tolman's conviction for official 
misconduct. 
III. PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Tolman also claims the trial court erred in denying his 
request for a preliminary hearing. Article I, section 13 of 
the Utah Constitution provides: 
Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of 
the state, or by indictment* with or 
without such examination and commitment. 
(Emphasis added). 
Although the constitution provides that following 
indictment an examination and commitment by a magistrate is 
optional, Utah R. Crim. P. 7(c) states that a preliminary 
examination shall nai be held if the defendant is indicted. 
Tolman claims that the statute clearly conflicts with the 
constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional. 
In order for a statute to be declared unconstitutional, a 
statute must "clearly violate some constitutional provision, 
and further, the violation must be clear, complete and 
unmistakable." Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drue Centers, Inc., 21 
Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958, 961 (1968); fififi alfifl Zamora v. 
Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981). In examining statutory 
constitutionality, the court must apply every reasonable 
presumption favoring constitutionality, acknowledging the 
legislative prerogative to enact laws. Id. at 962; Timoanooos 
Planning v. Central Utah Water. 690 P.2d 562, 564-65 (Utah 
1984). In addition, those who assert that a statute is 
unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating that it is 
unconstitutional. Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 
184, 191 (Utah 1984). 
Article I, section 13 provides that a preliminary hearing 
may be held after prosecution by indictment, but is not 
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required. The statute, however, states that a preliminary 
hearing shall not be held if a defendant is indicted. The 
constitution allows the legislature the discretion, therefore, 
to prohibit preliminary hearings after indictment, and such 
prohibition falls within the constitutional language. As a 
result, the statute is not in direct conflict with the 
constitution. 
IV. GRAND JURY TESTIMONY 
Tolman also asserts that the trial court erred in failing 
to suppress his grand jury testimony at trial. Tolman claims 
that his grand jury testimony was inadmissible because he was 
not informed of his right to counsel nor was he informed that 
he was the target of the investigation prior to testifying 
before the grand jury. 
In reviewing a trial court's evidentiary rulings, we defer 
to the trial court's advantageous position and will not 
overturn its decisions absent an abuse of discretion. 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 101 Utah Adv. Rep, 
27, 28 (Feb. 2, 1989). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-3 (1982) provides: 
Any person called to testify before the 
grand jury may be advised of his right to 
be represented by counsel. If a witness 
is or becomes a subject of the 
investigation, he shall be advised of that 
fact and of his right to counsel, and of 
his privilege against self incrimination. 
On demand of a witness for representation 
by counsel, the proceedings shall be 
delayed until counsel is present. 
In State v. Ruoqeri. 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969, 975 
(1967), the Utah Supreme Court stated that a witness, who was 
unaware that he was a target of a grand jury investigation, 
could not intelligently determine whether or not he needed 
counsel where he was not advised of the charges against him. 
In Ruaqeri, the witness testified before the grand jury and was 
later indicted for alleged perjury committed during his grand 
jury testimony. The court held that because the witness was 
not aware that he was a target of the grand jury proceeding, 
the trial court properly excluded his grand jury testimony in 
his perjury trial. Ifl. 
In this case, special prosecutors Rodney Snow and Larry 
Keller, and grand jury investigator Lorin C. Brooks met Tolman 
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outside the grand jury room prior to his testimony and advised 
him that he was the subject of the grand jury inquiry. Tolman 
responded that he did not realize he was a subject. Snow and 
Keller then told Tolman that he had the right to have counsel 
present outside the courtroom, that he could talk to an 
attorney before testifying, and that if he wanted to contact an 
attorney at any time he could. Tolman responded that he had an 
attorney and that he was aware of his rights. He also stated 
he was willing to appear despite the prosecutors* offer to 
postpone his testimony. Tolman then took the witness stand and 
acknowledged that he had a right to counsel. About a month 
later, when Tolman again testified before the grand jury, he 
was again informed of his right to counsel. Unlike Ruqoeri, 
Tolman knew he was a target of the grand jury investigation, 
prior to testifying. In addition, he was informed of his right 
to counsel. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not 
err in admitting Tolman*s grand jury testimony into evidence. 
V. JUROR AFFIDAVITS 
Tolman also asserts that his motion to arrest judgment 
should have been granted because a juror affidavit established 
that the verdict resulted from a divine revelation. Tolman 
contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the 
affidavit failed to show that an improper outside influence was 
present in the jury room. 
Generally, a juror affidavit can only be used to impeach a 
jury verdict when: 1) the verdict was determined by chance or 
bribery, Rosenlof v. Sullivan. 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1983); 
Hillier v. Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); or 
2) when "extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or an outside influence was 
improperly brought to bear upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 
606(b); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); Hillier, 
740 P.2d at 304. The reason for narrowly limiting the 
circumstances under which jury affidavits can be used to 
impeach a jury verdict is that otherwise, litigants would 
obtain juror affidavits on "all manner of things" and the 
process would become interminable and impracticable. Wheat v. 
Denver k R.G.W.R. Co.. 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932, 937 (1952). 
Further, "[s]uch post morterns would be productive of no end of 
mischief and render service as a juror unbearable." Ifl. 
In State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered whether a juror's affidavit regarding 
a divine revelation could be used to impeach the jury's verdict 
under Utah R. Evid. 606(b). In peMille, a juror affidavit 
stated that one juror allegedly told another juror during 
deliberations that she had prayed for a sign during closing 
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argument as to DeMilie's guilt and claimed to have received a 
revelation that if defense counsel did not make eye contact, 
DeMilie was guilty. Defense counsel did not make eye contact 
and DeMilie was found guilty. 
In reviewing whether the juror affidavit should have been 
admitted under Utah R. Evid. 606(b), the court stated that 
construing "outside influence" to include responses to prayer 
could well infringe upon the juror's religious liberties. Id. 
at 84. The court stated that as long as the juror can fairly 
weigh the evidence and apply the law to the facts, the juror's 
decision cannot be challenged on the ground that the juror 
reached the decision by aid of prayer. Id. Accordingly, the 
court held that under Rule 606(b), prayer and supposed 
responses to prayer are not included within the meaning of the 
words "outside influence." Id- The court also noted, however, 
that a juror might be disqualified from service if he or she is 
unable to fairly consider the evidence and properly apply the 
law due to oracular signs. Id. The court then found that this 
fact did not save DeMilie's challenge to the verdict for two 
reasons. Id. First, the affidavit did not aver facts which 
would disqualify a juror. Second, even if the affidavit 
averred such facts, the court stated, 
[a] claim that a juror is so affected by 
religious conviction as to disqualify him 
or her from service does not fall within 
these exceptions [Rule 606(b)]; rather it 
goes to the fitness of the person to serve 
on the jury, a matter that could and 
should have been raised at voir dire. 
Id. at 85. 
Applying the law to the facts in this case, we need not 
reach whether the affidavit alleged facts that would disqualify 
any juror because, according to DeMilie, juror affidavits 
regarding divine revelations do not fall within the exception 
set forth in Rule 606(b). Therefore, we hold that the trial 
court did not err in excluding the juror affidavit. 
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We have examined the other issues raised in this appeal and 
conclude that those issues are without merit. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Pamela T. GreenwooB, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Jud 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Case No. 870407-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal i s from a c o n v i c t i o n of Tampering w i t h 
W i t n e s s , a C l a s s A Misdemeanor, in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. 
S 7 6 - 8 - 5 0 8 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , and O f f i c i a l Misconduct , a C l a s s B 
Misdemeanor, in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 8 - 2 0 1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 
a f t e r a t r i a l in the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court . This Court 
has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 a -
3(2) (e) ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1 . Whether p r e j u d i c i a l error occurred p r i o r t o t r i a l ? 
A. Whether Count I of the Indictment was 
s u f f i c i e n t on i t s face? 
B. Whether defendant was e n t i t l e d be a preliminary 
hearing on the grand jury indictment? 
C. Whether the t r i a l court properly denied 
defendant's Motion for a B i l l of Part iculars? 
D. Whether the t r i a l court properly admitted the 
co -consp ira tor ' s statements as non-hearsay 
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E)? 
2. Whether prejudicial error occurred during trial? 
A. Whether the trial court properly admitted 
defendants grand jury testimony as 
constitutionally obtained? 
B. Whether the record establishes that Exhibits 
30, 31 and 32 were admitted into evidence? 
C. Whether this Court should consider the issue 
regarding the trial court's exclusion of 
hearsay statements in light of defendant's 
failure to support his claim of error with any 
record evidence, legal analysis, or authority? 
D. Whether defendant failed to preserve for review 
the issue regarding the constitutionality of 
the Tampering with Witness statute, and whether 
Jury Instruction 39 relieved the State of its 
burden of proof? 
3. Whether prosecutorial misconduct, if any, was 
harmless? 
A. Whether defendant fails to support his claim 
that he was singled out among grand jury 
"target" witnesses to be denied notice and 
right to counsel. 
B. Whether the prosecutor's alleged concealment of 
exculpatory evidence was harmless? 
C. Whether this Court should consider defendant's 
claim that the prosecutor attempted to prevent 
defense witnesses from testifying where 
defendant relies on matters outside the record? 
D. Whether the p rosecu tor ' s comment regarding 
defendant 's prospective r igh t to t e s t i f y was 
harmless since defendant did t e s t i f y a t t r i a l ? 
E. Whether prosecutor ia l misconduct requir ing 
reversa l occurred a t t r i a l ? 
1. Whether defendant f a i l s to show prejudice 
in l i g h t of the admission a t t r i a l of the 
alleged non-disclosed exculpatory evidence? 
2 . Whether defendant f a i l s to support h is 
claim of cumulative misconduct with l ega l 
ana lys is or authori ty? 
- 2 -
4. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
Motion to Arrest Judgment? 
5. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support 
defendant's convictions? 
6. Whether cummulative error exists? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ralph Tolman, was charged by Indictment with 
Criminal Conspiracy, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1978), Tampering with Evidence, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1978), 
Tampering with Witness, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-508 (1978), and Official Misconduct, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-201 
(1978) . 
Defendant was convicted of Tampering with a Witness a 
Class "A* Misdemeanor, and Official Misconduct, a class "BM 
Misdemeanor, in a jury trial held February 18, 1987 through March 
6, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Uno on May 5, 1987 
to perform 600 hours of community service in lieu of jail, to pay 
a fine of $2,500, and to remain on court supervised probation for 
a period of 18 months (R. 501-02)* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 1, 1983, a fire occurred at the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza in Murray, Utah (R. 540 at p. 272) . The 
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damages caused by the fire were in excess of one million dollars 
including damages to the office of Dr. Joe Culbertson, a Salt 
Lake County employee in the Mental Health Department (R. 540 at 
pp. 274f 286, and 359). After the fire had been extinguished, C. 
Dean Larsen, Assistant Chief and Fire Marshall for the Murray 
City Fire Department, reported that in his opinion the fire 
originated in the office of Dr. Culbertson due to the misuse of 
an extension cord and space heater (R. 540 at pp. 268, and 285-
86) • 
The next day, Evan Stephens, the Risk Manager for Salt 
Lake County, requested Bill Hyde, Chief Deputy of the Civil 
Division for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, to begin an 
investigation into the cause and origin of the fire due to the 
possible liability facing the County (R. 540 at pp. 346, and 363; 
R. 541 at p. 499). In response, a request for investigative 
assistance was sent to Claude Donald Harman, the Chief 
Investigator for the County Attorney's Office (R. 529 at pp. 116 
and 126) . Harman assigned defendant and investigator Olin Yearby 
to assist Murray City Fire Department in determining the cause 
and origin of the fire (R. 532 at p. 1233) . 
On Monday, May 2, 1985, defendant and Yearby went to 
the fire scene and assisted Chief Larsen in performing a "dig-
down- in Culbertson's office (R. 532 at p. 1233). Larsen 
explained to defendant his theory that the space heater in 
Culbertson9s office was the cause of the fire. id.. 
On May 3, 1988, defendant informed Mr. Stephens that he 
concurred with Mr. Larsen's opinion that the fire originated in 
-4-
the County offices (R. 532 at p. 1236)• Concerned about the 
County's liability, Mr. Stephens obtained authorization to hire 
Jim Ashby, a private fire investigator, to determine the cause 
and origin of the fire (R. 541 at p. 384-85). Mr. Stephens wrote 
Harman a letter on May 5, 1983 thanking him for the investigative 
assistance, explaining the County's exposure to substantial 
liability, and notifying him that an outside fire expert had been 
retained, £&. (State's Exhibit 12.) 
Subsequently, the space heater cord was examined by an 
independent laboratory which determined that the heater could not 
have been the cause of the fire since it was not energized at the 
time of the fire (R. 532 at p. 659). Based upon the laboratory 
results and his independent investigation, Mr. Ashby filed a 
cause and origin report on June 6, 1983 concluding that the fire 
originated in the attic above the county offices (R. 536 at pp. 
659-662) (State's Exhibit 18). 
On June 21, 1983, defendant prepared a case closure 
form which was rejected by his immediate supervisor, Sam Dawson, 
because it lacked a report on the fire (R. 532 at p. 124) 
(State's Exhibit 22). On August 1, 1983, defendant submitted a 
seven-page report to Mr. Dawson who refused to accept it stating 
that it "parroted- Larsen's fire report, it did not state the 
sources relied upon, and it made the County look bad (R. 532 at 
p. 1244) (State's Exhibit 8) (See Appendix "A"). At defendant's 
insistence, Dawson passed the report on to Harman for review (R. 
532 at p. 1245). Several days later, Harman called defendant 
into his office regarding the report. Id. Harman informed 
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Tolman that his report was unacceptable, that it "parroted" 
Larsen's report, that it made the County look bad, and ordered 
defendant to prepare a more concise report which referred to 
Ashby's favorable report (R. 535 at 869; R. 541 at pp. 444, 509 
and 561; R. 536 at pp. 665, 696, 702 and 748; R. 530 at pp. 14-16 
and 44; R. 532 at 1246). Harman further ordered defendant to 
shit can, destroy, deep six, shred, get rid of, and tear up the 
seven page report and submit a one-page, short report which did 
not identify the origin and source of the fire (R. 530 at p. 16; 
R. 535 at pp. 919 and 940; R. 530 at pp. 19 and 29; R. 530 at p. 
16; R. 535 at p. 869; R. 536 at p. 747; R. 535 at p. 924; R. 530 
at p. 15) . 
Soon thereafter, defendant telephoned Larsen and told 
him that Harman was angry about the content of the report, was 
concerned that it could cost the county millions of dollars, and 
wanted the report destroyed (R. 535 at p. 91, R. 532 at p. 1256). 
Defendant had given Larsen a courtesy copy of the report prior to 
Harman's rejection of the report (R. 532 at p. 1255-56). 
Defendant told Larsen to "destroy," "get rid of," "paper the 
walls with," "eat," and "deep six," the report, 1&. Defendant 
explained that Harman believed defendant and Larsen to be too 
close of friends and that defendant wrote the report to bolster 
Larsen's theory of the fire (R. 535 at p. 919). 
On August 25, 1983, defendant submitted a one-page 
report excluding any opinions as to the fire origin and simply 
referring to Ashby's report (State's Exhibit 7) (fififi. Appendix 
"B"). The report was quickly approved, signed by Harman, and 
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placed in the County Attorney's master file thus closing the case 
(R. 536 at pp. 752-53)• 
In November, 1985, Larsen revealed the existence of the 
seven-page report during a civil deposition inquiring into the 
cause of the fire (R. 535 at pp. 932 and 938). Larsen testified 
at the deposition that Harman had ordered defendant to destroy 
the report (R. 535 at p. 940). Soon after, the media reported 
that a cover-up existed in the County Attorney's Office regarding 
the investigative report (R. 530 at p. 9) • 
In 1986# a Salt Lake County Grand Jury was called to 
investigate possible criminal charges related to the alleged 
cover-up of reports regarding the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza fire (R. 537 at p. 1020). The Grand Jury subsequently 
indicted defendant and Harman for Criminal Conspiracyf Tampering 
with a Witness, Tampering with Evidence, and Official Misconduct 
(R. 195-99). After a jury trial held February 18, 1987 through 
March 6, 1987, defendant was convicted of Tampering with a 
Witness and Official Misconduct (R. 501-02). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Count I of the Indictment was facially sufficient to 
set forth the essential elements of the offense of Conspiracy. 
In any event, any alleged insufficiency was harmless since 
defendant was not convicted of Conspiracy. Defendant was not 
constitutionally entitled to a preliminary hearing on the grand 
jury indictment. Defendants Motion for Bill of Particulars 
improperly sought to discover State's evidence and limit the 
State's avenue of proof. The trial court properly found that the 
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prosecution had established a criminal conspiracy thus admitting 
the co-conspirator's non-hearsay statements pursuant to Rule 
801(d)(2)(E). 
The defendants grand jury testimony was 
constitutionally admissible since defendant was properly notified 
of his "target" status, his right against self-incrimination,, his 
right to counsel, the subject matter of the investigation, and 
the anticipated prospective charges, all prior to his grand jury 
testimony. Thus, defendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination and right 
to counsel before the grand jury. The record establishes that 
State's Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 were admitted into evidence. 
Because defendant fails to support his claim that the trial court 
erred in not admitting defense witness hearsay testimony, this 
Court should not consider defendant's claim. Defendant cannot 
raise the constitutionality of the Tampering with Witness statute 
for the first time on appeal. Jury Instruction Number 39 
requisitely related defendant's act of tampering to an official 
investigation or proceeding. 
Because defendant fails to support his claim that he 
was singled out among grand jury witnesses to be denied notice 
and right to counsel, this Court should not consider defendant's 
claim. The alleged non-disclosed exculpatory witnesses testified 
on defendant's behalf at trial and thus any alleged non-
disclosure was harmless. In the absence of record evidence, this 
Court should not consider defendant's assertion that the 
prosecution attempted to prevent defense witnesses from 
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testifying. Since defendant testified at trial, the prosecutor's 
statement regarding defendant's prospective right to testify was 
rendered harmless. Defendant merely speculates that there may be 
additional non-disclosed exculpatory evidence and therefore his 
speculative claim cannot be reversible error. Again, because 
defendant fails to support his argument with record evidence, 
legal authority, or legal analysis, defendant's claim of 
cumulative error should not be entertained. 
Defendant's attempt to impeach the verdict was improper 
where defendant erroneously claimed that the jury was exposed to 
an improper "outside influence," namely, God. Rule 606(b) 
precludes a defendant's attempt to establish by affidavit or 
testimony that a juror was affected by his or her religious 
convictions. Since defendant fails to support with record 
evidence whether a dictionary was used in the jury room or how it 
was used, this Court should assume the correctness of the 
verdict. 
The evidence was sufficient to establish the requisite 
elements of the offenses of Tampering with Witness and Official 
Misconduct. 
Defendant is not entitled to reversal of his 





NO REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED PRIOR TO 
TRIAL 
A. COUNT I OF THE INDICTMENT WAS SUFFICIENT 
ON ITS FACE. 
On appeal, defendant reasserts his position at trial 
that Count I of the Indictment was facially deficient (R. 62). 
Specifically, defendant claims that Count I did not allege how 
the co-defendant's had a unity of design to conspire. 
Defendant's claim should be rejected. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets 
forth the requirements of a charging document as follows: 
(b) An indictment or information shall 
charge the offense for which the defendant is 
being prosecuted by using the name given to 
the offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating in concise terras the definition of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. As information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause 
to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership 
need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. • . • 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4(b) (1982). 
Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(b), an indictment which 
charges a criminal offense by using the statutory definition 
setting forth the elements of the offense is sufficient on its 
face if it gives the defendant notice of the charge. However, 
due process may require that an accused be given sufficiently 
precise notification of the date of the alleged crime so that he 
can prepare his defense. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 772-73 
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(Utah 1 9 8 5 ) ; S t a t e v . L a i r b v , 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; MgNflir 
v , Hayward. 666 P.2d 3 2 1 , 326 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; S t a t e v . Bundv, 684 
P .2d 5 8 , 61 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-201 (1978) defines the offense of 
criminal conspiracy as follows: 
For purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that 
conduct constituting a crime be performed, 
agrees with one or more persons to engage in 
or cause the performance of such conduct and 
any one of them commits an overt act in 
pursuance of the conspiracy, except where the 
offense is a capital offense, a felony 
against the person, arson, burglary, or 
robbery, the overt act is not required for 
the commission of conspiracy. 
Further, the offense of tampering with evidence is 
defined as follows: 
A person commits a felony of the second 
degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or 
about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals or removes 
anything with a purpose to impair its verity 
of availability in the proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything 
which he knows to be false with a purpose to 
deceive a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
When an overt act is necessary to constitute the 
offense of conspiracy, Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-4 (1982) requires 
that the indictment expressly allege an overt act: 
On a trial for conspiracy in a case where 
an overt act is necessary to constitute the 
offense, the defendant shall not be convicted 
unless one or more overt acts are expressly 
alleged in the information or indictment, and 
unless one of the acts alleged has been 
proved. However, proof of overt acts not 
alleged may be given in evidence. 
-11-
Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-4 (1982) . 
In the present case , Count I of the Indictment charged 
as f o l l o w s : 
COUNT I 
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACYf CONSPIRACY TO TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE) 
Beginning from on or about August 1, 1983 
through on or about August 31, 1983, in Salt 
Lake County, intending that conduct 
constituting a crime be performedf and 
believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending or about to be 
instituted, defendants Claude Donald Harman 
and Ralph Tolman, then investigators of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 
conspired, combined, confederated and agreed 
with each other to alter, destroy, conceal or 
remove a report, with a purpose to impair the 
report's verity or availability in the 
proceeding or investigation, or to make, 
present or use a report, which defendants 
knew to be false, with a purpose to deceive a 
public servant or servants who were or may 
have been engaged in an official proceeding 
or investigation, said reports having been 
prepared by defendant Tolman regarding the 
origin of a fire that occurred on or about 
May 1, 1983 at the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza, Salt Lake County, that involved the 
destruction of County and private property. 
In furtherance, of the conspiracy and to 
effect the objects thereof, the following 
overt acts were committed: 
(a) On or about August 1 , 1983, 
defendant Harman, the then Chief 
Inves t igator of the Sa l t Lake County 
Attorney's Off ice , re jec ted defendant 
Tolman's August 1 , 1983, seven-page report 
about the or ig in of the Fashion Place 
Profess ional Plaza f i r e ; 
(b) On or about August 1, 1983, 
defendant Harman issued instructions to 
defendant Tolman to write a brief or one-
page report closing his investigation into 
the origin of the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire; 
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(c) On or about August 25, 1983, 
defendant Tolman submitted to defendant 
Harraan a one-page report which eliminated 
any reference to defendant Tolman1s 
opinion as to the origin of the fire; 
(d) On or about August 25, 1983, 
defendant Harman accepted and approved 
defendant Tolman's report of August 25, 
1983 as defendant Tolman1s official report 
regarding his investigation of the Fashion 
Place Professional Plaza fire; all in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-201, a 
felony of the Third Degree. 
(R. 195-97). 
As shown above, Count I of the Indictment precisely 
sets forth the statutory definition of the crime of conspiracy 
along with a detailed statement of facts which describes the 
alleged date of the crime, the evidence alleged to have been 
tampered with, and the conduct of the co-defendant's in mutually 
altering the content of the evidence. No additional factual 
information was necessary to set forth the essential elements of 
the offense. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Miller, 677 P.2d 
1129, 1132 (Utah 1984) discussed the requirements of alleging an 
overt act in a conspiracy case and noted as follows: 
[I]£ [the conspirators enter] 
into [an] agreement then the 
crime of conspiracy lis] complete 
when, in addition thereto, they, 
or either of them, [do] any act 
"to effect the object* of the 
agreement, even though that act 
did not itself effect the object 
of the agreement. 
State yt Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 383, 120 P.2d 
285, 295 (1941). If the overt act is done to 
effect the object of the conspiracy, it does 
not matter how remote the act may be from 
accomplishing its object. "The function of 
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the overt act in a conspiracy prosecution is 
simply to manifest 'that the conspiracy is at 
work,1 and is neither a project still resting 
solely in the minds of the conspirators nor a 
fully completed operation no longer in 
existence.11 Yates v. United States. 354 U.S. 
298, 334, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1084, 1 L.Ed.2d 
1356 (1957). 
State v. Miller. 672 P.2d at 1132 (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted). 
In the present case, the conspiracy charge alleges that 
defendant, at the request of Harraan, wrote a brief, one-page 
report regarding the Fashion Place fire in an attempt to alter or 
conceal the damaging seven-page report (R. 195-199). The alleged 
overt act of defendant was clearly the writing of the substitute 
report. Therefore, the Conspiracy charge was facially 
sufficient. 
In any event, the alleged error, if any, was harmless 
since defendant was not convicted of criminal conspiracy. The 
co-conspirator's hearsay statements were admissible based upon 
the trial court1s finding that a preponderance of evidence 
established that a conspiracy existed between defendant and 
Harman. The charging of the offense of conspiracy is not a pre-
requisite to the admission of co-conspirator•s statements. See 
Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Thus, no likelihood of a different 
result exists. 
B. JUDGE DANIELS PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
Defendant asserts that he was denied his right to a 
preliminary hearing under Article 1, Section 13 of the Utah 
Constitution. Defendant misreads the constiutitonal provision. 
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As stated earlier, the offenses charged against 
defendant were brought by grand jury indictment (R. 195-99)• 
Article 1, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
[Prosecution by information or indictment— 
Grand Jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted 
by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the 
consent of the State, or by indictment, with 
or without such examination and commitment. 
The formation of the grand jury and the 
powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature* 
As is clearly seen, the constitutional provision treats 
a prosecution by indictment differently than a prosecution by 
information. A preliminary examination is not required in a 
prosecution by indictment and the provision does not prohibit 
prosecution by indictment without a preliminary examination. The 
provision does require a preliminary examination in prosecutions 
by information, but simply provides that a prosecution by 
indictment may be "with or without*! such an examination. 
Defendant's interpretation siraply ignores the separate treatment 
of the two methods of prosecution. 
The provision further requires that the legislature set 
forth the duties and powers of the grand jury. Accordingly, Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7(c) provides that "a 
preliminary examination shall not be held if the defendant is 
indicted." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-7(c) (1982). It is well 
established that a legislative provision which is not clearly and 
expressly prohibited by or clearly in conflict with a provision 
of the Constitution is constitutional. Trade Commission v. 
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Skaggs Drug Centers Inc.. 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (Utah 
1968); Matheson v. Ferry. 641 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982); Allen v. 
Rampton. 463 P.2d 7 (Utah 1969); Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 
1010 (Utah 1974). The legislative language of Rule 7(c) not 
being in conflict with Article I, Section 13, Judge Daniels 
properly ruled that defendant was not entitled to a preliminary 
hearing. 
C. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars. He claims that further 
factual information was necessary to prepare his defense and that 
the trial court erred in failing to compel the prosecution to 
limit or circumscribe the area, field, or transaction to which 
evidence could be offered. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b) requires that an offense be 
charged as follows: 
An indictment or information shall charge 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating is concise terras the definitions of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. As information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause 
to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership 
need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, 
statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are 
generally known or by which they may be 
identified without setting forth a copy. 
However, details concerning such things may 
be obtained through a bill of particulars. 
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Neither presumptions of law nor matters of 
judicial notice need be stated. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(b) (1982). Additionally, Rule 4(e) 
provides for a Bill of Particulars under the following 
circumstances: 
When facts not set out in an information 
or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the 
offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars. 
The motion shall be filed at arraignment or 
within ten days thereafter, or at such later 
time as the court may permit. The court may, 
on its own motion, direct the filing of a 
bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at any time 
subject to such conditions as justice may 
require. The request for and contents of a 
bill of particulars shall be limited to a 
statement of factual information needed to 
set forth the essential elements of the 
particular offense charged. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(e) (1982). 
In the present case, the offenses of Tampering with a 
Witness and Official Misconduct were set forth in Count IV and 
Count V of the Indictment as follows: 
COUNT IV 
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS—RALPH TOLMAN) 
During the month of August 1 9 8 3 , in S a l t 
Lake County, b e l i e v i n g t h a t an o f f i c i a l 
proceed ing or i n v e s t i g a t i o n was pending or 
about t o be i n s t i t u t e d , de fendant Ralph 
Tolman did at tempt t o induce or o t h e r w i s e 
cause C. Dean Larsen t o w i thho ld t e s t i m o n y , 
i n f o r m a t i o n , document, or t h i n g , in t h a t 
de fendant Tolman r e q u e s t e d C. Dean Larsen t o 
d e s t r o y or d i s p o s e of de fendant T o l m a n ^ 
seven-page i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t of August 1 , 
1 9 8 3 , regarding the May 1 , 1 9 8 3 , Fashion 
P l a c e P r o f e s s i o n a l P laza f i r e ; a l l in 
v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 8 - 5 0 8 , a 
f e l o n y of the Third Degree . 
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COUNT V 
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT—UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OR FAILURE OF DUTY) 
During the month of August, 1983, in Salt 
Lake County# defendants Ralph Tolman and 
Claude Donald Harman, then investigators for 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and 
public servants, with the intent to benefit 
themselves or another, or to harm another, 
knowingly committed unauthorized acts which 
purported to be acts of their office, or 
knowingly refrained from performing a duty 
imposed upon them by law or clearly inherent 
in the nature of their office, in that said 
defendants altered, destroyed, concealed or 
removed Ralph Tolman's seven-page 
investigative report of August 1, 1983, 
regarding the May 1, 1983, Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire, with the purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in an 
official proceeding or investigation which 
was pending or about to be instituted; all in 
violation of Utah Code Ann, S 76-8-201, a 
Class B Misdemeanor (R. 198-99). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion for a Bill of 
Particulars requesting the prosecution to state with regards to 
Count IV: (1) the specific acts alleged to have been committed 
by defendant Tolman to induce or cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold 
testimony information documents or things; (2) which element of 
testimony, information, document or thing was alleged to have 
been the subject of such inducement or cause beside the seven-
page report; (3) whether said report was in fact withheld by C. 
Dean Larsen; (4) the date, time, location and general nature of 
acts alleged; (5) the nature of the official proceeding or 
investigation which was pending or about to be instituted; and 
(6) the specific basis for alleging that defendant Tolman 
believed that such proceeding or investigation as described above 
was pending or about to be instituted (R. 65-66)* With regards 
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t o Count V, d e f e n d a n t request*- -re UL the 
b e n e f i t < »>i: harm intended by defendai" olraan; t h t s p e c i f i c 
a c • t s w I: i I ::: t , d e f e i ,< 3 a i 11 T o 1 HI a n j, >o r f or xned • ~ a i 1 ed oe r f or m; 13) 
the s p e c i f i c b a s i s upon which i ••. J ' •• * r 
o m i s s i o n s performed by defendant Tolraan were knowingly performed 
! in i ' i i i i i 1 in i 1 in inn i i in in in i 'it i i n q iMii i mi 11 m a t t e r a n d u p o n 
. S : ^ M i t . r accompany in , ..emoranduin. HP t r i j t -I 
^ n a a n i ^ Mutxw, * - - •• t ^ : r ; . I j r s t * . 159 * 
U p o n a n . <- •
 : -r - * ±.un, 
d e f e n d a n t ' s e q u e s t ~< ir.y: ; •--1 - Supreme ^ J ; * as 
~ ui a i ' i! P a r t i c u l a r s : * : * . i :• 
t h e a c c u s e d w h a t e v e r f o r m a t i o n Hie P J U H P I u t i in n x 
t n e d a t e , t i m e , and p l a c e of the a l l e y e d o f f e n s e . S t a t e v . 
Robbing . How eve: — G> rt has 
c l e a i l y s t a t e d t h a t - - : , u . a r F np« d l . U j r s 
i d e n c e , * ^ ' a s a rif^io , enab le 
d e f e n d a n t s tu o b t a i n ci iimnou i lln | i i IT I I I I < HI * s H / i d e n c e * Id» 
at 111; S t a t e v , M i t c h e l l , 57 ] F . 2d U S ! , , ] 3 1J 1 (Utah 19 > /) ; i .Laif i 
V .. J I U M . d ' "^  I1 Jt\ H H
 r H * < I I ^ M.l) ; S t a t e v . 
W i n t e r s » 16 U t a h 'MI I , , H in // H i i /m m I in 1 i S t a I u > * 
liflLCX, 8 U t a h 1 2 8 , . . 2 d 8 5 2 , 8 5 5 ( 1 9 5 0 ) ; S t a t e v . J a m e s o n , 
11 1 11 1 1 ( I 4 * 1 
present case, defendan
 3 e 
theory ; /idence which the p ; - , , . intended * JS-
provin i 11 defendant cannot attempt 
•freeze" the State s a^>* advance ^ «T* i, i.-
 rie 
the State from utilizing evidence that r; ^ develop at tr i 
-„1 Q 
Defendant's request was not to c l a r i f y a vague element of the 
crime, but rather , an e f f o r t to discover the S t a t e ' s evidence and 
l i m i t the S t a t e ' s a l t e r n a t i v e avenues of proof. See State v. 
Rmstlk, 736 P.2d 1059, 1063-1064 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J . , 
d i s s e n t i n g ) ; S tate v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985) . Thus, 
defendant's Motion for B i l l of Part i cu lars was improper and 
cannot be grounds for error. 
In any event , the S t a t e ' s refusal to respond to 
defendant's Motion for a B i l l of Part icu lars was harmless. The 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that an error i s harmless where 
there i s no subs tant ia l l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t in the 
absence of the error. See State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 637 
(Utah 1982) . As shown above, the e s s e n t i a l elements of the 
charged o f fenses and the f a c t s in support thereof were c l e a r l y 
and s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t forth in the Indictment as required by Rule 
4(b) (R. 198 -99 ) . No further information was necessary to inform 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged. 
Notably, defendant f a i l s to a l l e g e in h i s brief what 
s p e c i f i c information was necessary to h i s defense and how the 
lack of the s p e c i f i c information prejudiced h i s defense . 
Addi t iona l ly , defendant was provided copies of a l l grand jury 
t r a n s c r i p t s regarding the charged offense (R. 116 -19 ) . In the 
absence of a showing of any prejudice , the t r i a l count 's denial 
of defendant's motion was harmless error at most. 
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_ . TOE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE NON-HEARSAY 
CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 
8 0 1 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( E ) . 
Defendant asserts that the 
that a conspiracy existed and that defenda * x* a party 
conspiracy learsay 
conspirator statements i 
pei t i nc-'nt part as i ol i own • 
Statements which are not hearsay. 
A statement is not hearsay if 
The statement is offered against a party and 
is , a statement by a co-conspirator of 
a party during the course and in the 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The Utah Supreme i mu i i im i i IHO .1 .inula n\ to In- applied to 
co-conspi rat or • s statements in State v. Gray, i" U i d h 
J 9HI ,"i, ii 11»,ii ir i mi as f 0 n 0 W S : 
We acknowledge the divergent authority 
the subject and hold today, in accordance 
with the prevailing view, that the criminal 
venture and the defendant's participation 
therein must be established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. When applying the 
standard to determine whether to admit a co-
conspirator's hearsay statementsf the court 
may consider the accused's own statements 
indicating his involvement in the conspiracy, 
as well as actions by the accused or the 
declarant. » 
X d « d" I I .Jl .1 "^  I I. ' *• i > i i I I i « I ) i 
1 I'll the p r e s e n t c a s e , the t r i a l ann l pen i!';ii"«l II 
prosecution to e s t a b l i s h independently the criminal venture and 
defendant's p a r t i c i p a t e e admission of the 
co -consp ira tor ' s s tatements . At the time of the r u l i n g , the 
! tridu defendant had prepared a seven-page 
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report concluding that the f i r e originated in the County o f f i c e s , 
that Harraan had rejected the report s t a t i n g i t made the County 
look l i a b l e , that Harman ordered defendant to prepare a short , 
one-page report referr ing to Ashby fs report which concludes the 
f i r e or ig inated elsewhere, that defendant submitted the one-page 
report as ordered de le t ing h i s i n v e s t i g a t i v e f i n d i n g s , and that 
Harman approved the one-page report (R. 536 at pp. 696 and 747) 
(State's Exhibits 7 and 8). 
Based upon the independent evidence, the trial court 
found as follows: 
Based on testimony that has been given so 
far, the Court is of the opinion that the 
evidence does show that there is some, either 
whether you call it cover-up or some evidence 
that would indicate that there is, on the 
part of the parties involved, an effort to 
not have the report that is the subject 
matter of this particular hearing not to be 
divulged publicly as far as the records of 
the county attorney is concerned* 
(R. 535 at p. 868) . 
As the Utah Supreme Court s tated in Gray * an appe l la te 
court "will not d is turb the rul ing of the t r i a l court on 
quest ions of a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence unless i t c l e a r l y appears 
that the lower court was in error ." Sxa^r at 1316; £j£j£ jalsi^ 
Sta te v. Cole . 674 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983) . The t r i a l court 
made i t s f inding that the evidence e s tab l i shed a cover-up by the 
p a r t i e s to conceal the i n v e s t i g a t i v e report . Thus, the non-
hearsay co-conspirator statements were properly admitted. 
Defendant further argues that the t r i a l court erred by 
f a i l i n g to hold a p r e t r i a l hearing on the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the 
co-conspirator statements pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (R. 
2 9 - 3 0 ) . Rule 104(a) provides as f o l l o w s : 
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Questions admissibility generally. 
Prelimmdry questions concernii ig the 
qualification of a person to be witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court, subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (b)• In making its determination 
it is not bound by the rules of evidence 
except those with respect . iv;i jes. 
pretrial determina* •* i... «^ .*.. 
<?* * * rminatj * ^ * preliminary. 1 , •* ; accord with 
ti - Supreme . ^  i - a 
conspirator'-- statement- t >* i *isio-ua^y -adn.itteJ sat ject *-<"> 
i < * inding f admissibility o^ t*. :•.-
Bourjaily v. United gtates# 483 u . s . . . , w ..,Ed_ 
ct " M M -> " ii* II n j j H i t w y^Jagkspnr 7 ^ * • :* • *486 
(4th c i r , IHHM; United States•iLL-Vinson/ bi)<< »--'* 
1979)
 r cert- denied, 444 i * I 074 iHHmi and United States x^ 
£ i n e £ r i "i '< M > : -• •• - • * 
analogous Federal Rules ut Evidence) Accordingly, the i r i d . 
h I f. l i i, f a i l i n c » *• ; r e i r . a l hear ing regarding 
true a d m i s s i b i l i t . - s 
Defendar* ina l l y urges that the t r i a l cou r t erre:l hy 
making i t s finding admiss ibi l 
Supreme Court, in Gr^y merely required the t r i a l court to mako -^he 
t i n i l J in i i iiJiiii i J.LI i ti i i i i m i in li i» i e c o i u a i a t the t r i a l 
court restate the evidence relied upon iv il« ruli KJ. l-io;, -Jt 
1319. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concurs that a t .rial 
court need not pinpoint the evidence relied upon. United States 
v. Cattle King Packing Co.. Inc.. 793 F.2d 232, 242 (10th Cir. 
1986); AQQQJ& United States v. Buchanan. 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 
1986)* As noted earlier, the prosecution had established 
sufficient independent evidence to support the trial court1s 
finding of admissibility. 
POINT II 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
RELEVANT TRANSCRIPTS OF DEFENDANT'S GRAND 
JURY TESTIMONY 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the 
introduction of his grand jury testimony (R. 188-91, 200-05). 
Defendant claimed that he was not notified of his "target" status 
before the grand jury and of his constitutional rights. Id. 
Defendant now asserts these claims on appeal. 
The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
Any person called to testify before the 
grand jury may be advised of his right to be 
represented by counsel. If a witness is or 
becomes a subject of the investigation, he 
shall be advised of that fact and of his 
right to counsel, and of his privilege 
against self-incrimination. On demand of a 
witness for representation by counsel, the 
proceedings shall be delayed until counsel is 
present. In the event that counsel of the 
witness1 choice is not available, he shall be 
required to obtain or accept other counsel. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-11-3(2) (1982). The Utah Supreme Court set 
forth the requirements for target witnesses in State v. Ruggeri, 
19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967). In Ruggeri. the witness was 
not notified of his target status nor the subject matter of the 
grand jury proceedings. 1£. at 972-73. The witness was later 
indicted for perjury in connection with his grand jury testimony. 
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The Supreme Cour 1 held as f uJ .1 OWE ; 
It would seem that a witness who is 
unaware that he is a target of a grand jury 
investigation could not intelligently 
determine whether or not he needed counsel 
unless he was fully advised of the charges 
being considered against him; and until he 
has full knowledge regarding that matter, he 
will not know when to assert his 
constitutional claim of privilege against 
self-incrimination. It would also be 
difficult to believe that he could 
intelligently waive the right to com lsel 
under such ci rcumstances. 
1A. at 9 75. 
1
 i " ' " M M ' I t c a s e , the • ecord is c i ear that defendant 
w a s notified of his target s t a t u s , hi1 i nihii i M M J M ' . C I I .H 1 the 
subject ;ij|fr, «,f , ! I P I roceedings, a J 1 prior I his enti) * r, * 
the grand JLII, i a Subpoena Duces Teci
 ? 
defendant appeared ojtside x , *«. a, i •'•!»•" room on 
Defendant was ii^ * > • ^  v anil Larry Keller, 
grand jury special ^rosecut m ' " -rand iury 
'estigator (R. Keller advibt-j defendant 
was I, In" ,'!", a - nquiry. Id, 
Defendant responded that 
The prosecut : advised defendar* - . < - ma: .- . ^ 
thai hv hii-'j |i
 t dLtui' < ^ ^  > ? appearance 
and that he may do endant-
attorney, that * rights, and that -~~v 
he could stop u m u uu consult a., attorney 
(R. 537 v 
Defendant went ) explain that some police officers 
have a cop mentali* * * $ 
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questions only later to find out that charges are brought against 
them for statements made. !£. Defendant said that he had the 
mentality to realize that he could stop the proceedings and 
consult an attorney if he desired. Id.. He stated that he had 
done nothing wrong, that he was willing to proceed without the 
presence of his attorney, and that he wanted to get on with it. 
!£. Again, Mr. Snow emphasized that defendant had a right to an 
attorney and that the hearing could be postponed if defendant so 
desired. Id. 
Defendant was further notified of the subject matter of 
the grand jury inquiry by the Subpeona Duces Tecum, which 
requested "all reports [he] prepared on the Fashion Place Mall 
fire approximately May, 1983" (R. 249). He was also notified in 
person by the special prosecutors (R. 537 at p. 1031). Defendant 
acknowledged that he understood that his testimony involved 
possible criminal charges regarding tampering with evidence (R. 
537 at p. 1031). 
Applying Ruqqeri to the present case. Defendant was 
informed of his target status, the subject of the proceedings, 
and the possible charges contemplated against him. A full 
recitation of the Miranda warning was unnecessary and would have 
been improper. £&& In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 7 9 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Ut. Sup. Ct. filed March 31, 1988); United 
States v. Mandujano. 425 U.S. 564, 580 (1975). Warnings against 
self-incrimination, even in the presence of the grand jury, are 
sufficient to satisfy Fifth Amendment protections. United States 
v. Washington. 431 U.S. 181, 191 (1977). 
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Null ill!;, , defendant does not c l a i m th.it he d id n o t 
understand h i s r i g h t a g a i n s t ^ompul soi y > <-1 ) - i » t mw it inn 
r i g h t to c o u n s e l . Defendant merely c l a i m s t h a i , under the 
n in;'! i,J in, y i: (illicit i he c nld nun waive h i s l i g h t s even it" he d e s i r e d 
t o • Defendant "|l & c I a i in i g n o r e s the w e l l - e s t a b I i s h e d \ > t 111i.: i p a I 
th a t a k n o w i n c,j i n t e l l i g e n t , and v o 1 u n t a r y w a i v e r o f 1- i t th and 
S i x 11 J AJU e 11 djii c I i 1111, i. i i ,I «i:«.»r \ t, i I u I i o 11 a 1 I y pe r m i s s i b l e . Johnson 
v. Z e r b s t . 304 U.S. 4SH (19.iB). Because defendant was p r o p e r l y 
i'"' i f o r m e d o t I" i s r i y h t s a n ci h e c ,1 a i, m s n o c o e r c i o n , t h i s C o i J L t 
s h o u 11J u p h o I d 1, 111. 11 i 1 J I i" i -111 I 11 I J 111 i i r i' | l 11 11 .' 11 • i e ml. 1 n t * r, ij r and 
j u r y tes t imony was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y o b t a i n e d . 
iii!"! STATE'S EXHIBITS 30, J l A14L J*' WERE ADMITTED 
INTO EVIDENCE. 
Defend.ini a s s e r t s t h a t S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t s 30, 31 and 32 
( e x c e r p t s oi d e f e n d a n t ' s g rand j u r y t e b t j inuey ,"i wei tji t of f e red 
oi" r e c e i v e d in Mir t, i: iaJ cnurk • J n I 3 t h u s cannot be c o n s i d e r e d as 
ev idence < in appea l Ilnw»ji »'ei ,„ tin1 i i: i a I cour t r e c o r d c l e a r l y 
e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e e x h i b i t s were a d m i t t e d and t h u s may be 
c o n s i d e r e d a s e v i d e n c e on appeal (R. I4t! 
c BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
WITH RECORD EVIDENCEf LEGAL ANALYSIS, OR 
LEGAL AUTHORITY, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT 
CONSIDER WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
EXCLUDING HEARSAY STATEMENTS. 
Defendant c l a i m s 
t h a t c e r t a i -es t imony of Mike hi i s t e n s e n was i n a d m i s s i b l e 
h e d ir iHI i : : t * ^ 
T h e * t ) 
(1987) requires that appellant > "contain 
cun i.eivt ion respect iu UJC issues presented 
, ?7 . 
and the reasons therefor , with c i t a t i o n s to the a u t h o r i t i e s , 
s t a t u t e s , and parts of the record r e l i e d on.M Defendant f a i l s , 
however, to specify in h i s brief which statements were not 
admitted, where the statements appear in the record, and where 
the t r i a l court ruled the statements were inadmiss ib le . Further, 
defendant f a i l s to support h i s claim with any re levant l e g a l 
a n a l y s i s or authority as required by State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) . 
Under these circumstances, the Court should assume the 
correctness of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g . State v. S t e g g e l l . 660 
P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983) (correctness of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
judgment i s assumed when counsel on appeal f a i l s to comply with 
Utah R. Civ. P. 75(p)(2) (2) (d) (1977) - - - the rule that preceded R. 
Utah Ct. App. 24(q)(6) (1987) ) ; State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755, 
757 (Utah 1982) . In that M [ t ]he burden of showing error i s on 
the party who seeks to upset the judgment,1! State v. Jones . 657 
P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982) , the State should not be put to the 
task of developing defendant's l ega l arguments by searching 
through the record and making references thereto to support 
defendant's factual a l l e g a t i o n s . Thus, t h i s Court should not 
consider defendant's claim of error in the absence of re levant 
record and authority c i t a t i o n s . 
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D. DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE 
REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
TAMPERING WITH WITNESS STATUTE, AND; JURY 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 39 WAS PROPERLY GIVEN. 
D e f e n d a n t F a i l e d To C h a l l e n g e The 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y Of The Tampering 
With Ev idence S t a t u t e ;n 1h« T r i a l 
C o u r t And I s Thus P r e c l u d e d F 
R a i s i n g The I s s u e On A p p e a l . 
De fendan t c l a i m s t h a t Utah Code A.,J* I 
(1978) i s u* r * • M.I : i . \ a . jt- a:.- . ert>r ad . While 
a d m i t t i n g t h a i . * c i v e t h e i s s u e Dt. +, 
d e f e n d a n t a r g t - •,~ : M s t a t u t e b i .a.r/:y u n c o n s t i t u H o: 
1: r ev iew 
The law ^ WP • n o t 
c h a l l e n g e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; * ,i i d i u t ^ * or r • : . ime 
on , ,
 v * „ , * - . 
Fur t h e . , b e c a u s e t h e ( J-. • * . . . I lie 
t r i a l I~VUL c ^ * -J r a i s e j , i s s u e sua s p o n t e was r * 
e r r o r . X&. a , S t a t e y j .C4LLfi£ Jl i <» '» ' < f' • ?' i 51 2 i 01 ah 1 9 8 1 ) , 
££JL£. d e n i e d , 4hb ~ ~"8 (1982) ( h o l d i n g t l i . i l Utah Code Ann. 
S c r:0 8 - i a iiwu un rons f 11 n t i ona l ly vjijue oi o v e r b r o a d ) . 
D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s lliui IIJ . , u l ip i t iun ! n I1 t r u c t i o n 
Number 39 r e m o t e l y p r e s e r v e s t h e i s s u e of s t a t u t o r y 
II, "iJ.." tit p M2Hi . Howeve: . defenda* : ! s 
ob jec* i^ . c . -' . s WJ . hi " i i oj" st« I j nt i - - . 
more p roper ^ Th o b j e c t i o n c o u l d L -C have pu 
d e f e n d a n t was c h a l l e n g i n g -
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y of t h e s t a t u t . M - . j - -
shou ld r e f r a i n from c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m e r i t s . d e f e n d a n t ' s b e l a t e d 
cha] l e n g e . 
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2. Jury Instruction Number 39 did 
not relieve the State of its 
burden of proof. 
Defendant asserts that Jury Instruction Number 39 
effectively relieved the State of its burden of proof. 
Specificallyf defendant contends that the instruction does n 
require the jury to find that the acts of tampering relate t 
defendant's knowledge of a pending investigation or official 
proceeding. Defendant's claim is clearly meritless. 
At trial, the Court instructed the jury that: 
In order to convict the defendant, Ralph 
Tolman, of the crime of Tampering With a 
Witness, as alleged in Count IV of the 
Indictment, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. That the defendant, Ralph Tolman, 
believed that an official proceeding or 
investigation was pending or about to be 
instituted; 
2. That the defendant knowingly or 
intentionally attempted to induce or 
otherwise cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold 
Ralph Tolman's seven-page investigative 
report of August 1, 1983, regarding the 
May 1, 1983, Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza fire; and 
3. That the offense occurred on or 
about and between August 1, 1983, and 
August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
If you believe that the evidence 
establishes each of the foregoing elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to 
find the defendant, Ralph Tolman, guilty of 
Tampering With a Witness. On the other hand, 
if the evidence has failed to so establish 
one or more of the said elements, then it is 
your duty to find the defendant not guilty. 
(R. 416) (emphasis added). 
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As shown a b o v e , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n r*>* 
i in 11i111 • i iriL| mi p e r s o n (v . l ^ a r s en ) w i t h h o l d a rocument 
t h i n g ( d e f e n d a n t ' s s e v e n - p a g e i n v e s t i g a t e j i:i'| i*n 
•; " ! ,e "*4 ti~*^ finding ^: *e -iurv 
Ih j 1 Iff * pceu LU xnuu^e i - >~ * *. w'i thholt: -
i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r : i c c n f f i c i p n t 
t h e o f f i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n :>ceedin '• , - * . _, . . , , ^ 
f"J i (i in i l l ' i * :r ' c i J ^ . 
PQJNT I I I 
NO PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT RESULTING IN 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED IN THF 7F-T AL 
COURT BELOW. 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
THAT HE WAS SINGLED OUT AMONG GRAND JURY 
"TARGET" WITNESSES TO BE DENIED NOTICE 
AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Defendan t a r g u e s t h a t bt« w«ii i lie only g rand j u r y 
" t a r g e t " w i t ^ e ^ s w! v
 t , i<I \ „ i 1 1 „ «> n i b t d i y t i 
s t a t u s , was d e n i e d t h e r i g h t t<< have c o u n s e l p r e s e n , *~A was r ^ t 
2 p r o s p e c t cha rges * i c e a ' i 7 f 
d e f e n d a n t f a i l s . s u p p o r t ;.*t, argumen 
l e g a l a u t h o r i t y , l e g a l a n a l y s i s a s r e q u i r e d r , :-* r ^ t * . 
1 1 * c o t r d i n g l y , 
t r . ; o C o u r t s h o u l d c o n s i d e r d e f e n d a n t * L&Lii y.j. 
AmiCPI)£r 689 P .2d 1 3 4 1 , 1344 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; S t a t e v . S t e g g e l l , 660 
J'11 ' '" i "> ' M d t e v « r u c k e r , 657 P.2d 7 5 5 , 7 57 
(Utah 1982)* 
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B. THE PROSECUTORS' ALLEGED CONCEALMENT 
OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. 
Defendant asserts that the special prosecutors 
concealed potentially exculpatory evidence consisting of 
transcripts of the grand jury testimony of Mike Christensenf 
Shauna Clark, and Jim Burns. However, defendant admits in his 
brief that the above witnesses testified on defendant's behalf at 
trial and that he was supplied copies of their grand jury 
testimony. Under such circumstances, prejudicial error could not 
have occurred and, in fact, defendant does not claim any 
prejudice. In the absence of prejudicial error, this Court 
should find no reversible prosecutorial misconduct occurred. 
State V. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985). 
C. BECAUSE DEFENDANT RELIES ON MATTERS 
OUTSIDE THE RECORD, THIS COURT SHOULD 
NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT 
THE PROSECUTOR ATTEMPTED TO PREVENT 
DEFENSE WITNESSES FROM TESTIFYING. 
Defendant claims that special prosecutor, Larry Keller, 
spoke to witness Shauna Clark prior to trial and attempted to 
influence Ms. Clark not to testify. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 
32-33). Defendant's claim is unsupported by the record. 
The Utah Supreme Court s tated in State v. Bingham, 6 84 
P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) , that an appe l la te court cannot rule on 
matters outs ide the t r i a l court record. This rule c l e a r l y 
a p p l i e s to the present case where defendant bases h i s argument on 
an e x t r a - j u d i c i a l conversat ion which took place in the courtroom 
foyer and which appears nowhere in the record. Therefore, in the 
absence of record evidence , t h i s Court should assume the 
correc tness of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s rul ing that no prosecutor ia l 
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m i s c o n d u c t o c c u r r e d . See S t a t e v . S t e q g e l l , , 6fi0 P.2d 252 , 253 
( U t a h * * - . 
D e f e n d a n t a p p e a r s *-~ f u r t h e r a r g u e t h a t the t i i a l . '-. ' .it 
i m p r o p e r l y r u l e d t h a t cei t<- l e f e n s e * i : n e s s e s c o u l d n o t t e s t i f y 
r e g a r d i n g h e a r s a y s i a teinen i Vi„n;i r
 r d e f e n d a n t 
f a i l * ? &„. *i 'i- a rgument w i t h * : e v i d e n c e , l e g a l 
IJL aiiaxj * • . De fendan t s imple a r g u e s t h a t t h e 
h e a r s a y •- *r> m\ 
<11 F -<-;;: on ar^ c ^ n c l u j . C ^ ' cr >secutor misconduct .\ „; i ed by 
I i i n u i e b u l i ' -^ * ib *. cf 
defenda- :. i- =>^ j. ;\-i t t : ai , ,™^n*-«f tb > * ^ 
entcxLajin d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i n , ; i r >i * *_, 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S PROSPECTIVE RIGHT TO 
TESTIFY WAS HARMLESS SINCE DEFENDANT 
TESTIFIED AT TRIAL. 
D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment t h a t 
t e s t : r . Al though th* p rosecu t* 
improper# cou ld not have? c o n s t i t u t e d p r e j u d i c i a l * i : 
, iH'ftMise c o u n s e l a t t e m p t e d 
w i t n e s s M u r C h r i s t i e n s e i i s t a t e m e n t s 
about" the t ime ot the? c r i m e (R. 531 s-_ , . ( 1 2 ^ . - u s e r u ^ -
K e l l i " i > ]c i*1 • ii < ion ot u i e s t a t e m e n t ^ hearsay 
grounds . ! £ • The d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g frhe o > 
a s f o l l o w s : 
MR. DeLAND: He's talking about his state of 
mind. He's not — it's not what Mike 
believes his state of mind to be, it's what 
he is stating his state of mind to bef why 
he's angry. 
. 33™. 
MR. KELLER: Your Honor, I understand Mr. 
Tolman i s going to t e s t i f y . He cer ta in ly can 
t e l l us a l l about i t himself* I t doesn' t 
need to come in through t h i s w i t n e s s . I t ' s 
object ionable hearsay. 
THE COURT: Just based on what was 
represented to the Court, we do have the 
declarant here and the declarant can t e s t i f y 
as to what h i s s t a t e of mind was. 
I would l i k e to remind Mr. Keller 
that the declarant i s thus far not a v a i l a b l e . 
He has a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ight not to t e s t i f y , 
and i f that i s the bas i s we're going to hear 
from him anyway, I think t h a t ' s 
objec t ionable . I don't think t h a t ' s a good 
objec t ion . 
MR. KELLER: Submit i t , your Honor. 
THE COURT: I guess if the declarant i s not 
a v a i l a b l e , then he can do i t . But i f he ' s 
a v a i l a b l e , I am not sure what he ' s going to 
do. If he does take the stand, then i t 
wouldn't be — if he doesn' t take the stand, 
maybe you can r e c a l l him. 
MR. DeLAND: Well , he i s n ' t on the stand y e t 
and i t ' s Friday. 
MR. SNOW: I thought you might object i f we 
c a l l e d him. 
MR. DeLAND: Has the Court ruled? 
THE COURT: I am thinking here. On the horns 
of a dilemma. We'll overrule the object ion 
and you may t e s t i f y . 
(R. 531 at pp. 1205-06) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part t e s t for 
determining whether a prosecutor ' s remark warrants r e v e r s a l : 
• (1) did the remarks c a l l to the a t t ent ion of the jurors matters 
which they could not properly consider in determining the ir 
v e r d i c t , and (2) were the jurors under the circumstances of the 
part icu lar case probably influenced by those remarks." State v. 
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Tucker, 7 27 P.2d ne utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, " 1 «J I n} error, defect, irregularity 
i i'.!i i -feet I hr substantial rights of a 
party shall L - disregarded ih '"uilt1 ^ nn 
(1982) . 
1 S t a t e v,
 ±M> ,. ,zu JI < . (1985) , t h e Utah 
Supreme Cou: ' ?. : - ; - I - J : J^* "^ p r e s e n t hel 
p r o s e c u t o r commer r - p r e j u d i c i a l . In Tuckei 
p r o s e c u t j - d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d i d 
n o t e x p l a ; ' *r,e de fendar jttKii.j.^ r.,.-aJ h i m s H I wh i J «• • in 
c - Defense c o u n s e l q u i c k l y 
o b j e c t e d a:.- i * •• * iar.i j i d 
no* Ktive tr '« : ; o ^ s , : . f r . i. . . s i i i . j c e r L c . i ^ . The 
Su L tiie p i u s e c a t o r i c u mi sconduc t was : t; 
p r e j u d i c i a l t - u . e c a u s e * •- w * c no*- r e p e t , , 
t h e . <^ "" r t ,;,. , c \ . . 3':'w d e c i s i v e l y -r>viat^d tr.- «: * ; ^u 
adm • „ was iiu r e a s o n a b l e 
l i k e l i h o o d d i f f e r e n t r e s u l ab sence : - . 
Id. 
I omment * - r e s e n t 
c a s e was n - i n t e n t i o n a l , r e p e t i t i v e . -. 
p r e j u d i c e ,•: i ~ r e g a r d i n g d e f e n d a n t 1 . : :
 5 not t o 
t e s t i f y . .minimum qhed t h e p r o s e c u t o r # in 
t h e p r e s e n c e - , che d e f e n d a n t h a s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r i g h t *ut t u e s t i f y 2 0 5 - 0 6 ) . The t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
admonishment e f f e c t i v e s 
p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment. See S t a t e v . H a l e s . tV'SZ P.2d 1 2 9 0 , 1292 
i'l Mh H''8y», • S U U /, ...^ilimailf 750 P .2d 5 4 6 , 555 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) . 
F u r t h e r , any harm r e s u l t i n g from the p r o s e c u t o r ' s 
comment was e f f e c t i v e l y removed when the defendant took the 
s t a n d . The Kansas Supreme Court , under i d e n t i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
he ld t h a t "the d e f e n d a n t , by tak ing the s t a n d , e f f e c t i v e l y 
removed any p o s s i b l e p r e j u d i c e from the minds of the j u r o r s , " 
S t a t e v , P u r s l e y . 238 Kan 2 5 3 , 710 P.2d 1 2 3 1 , 1240 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . In 
the absence of a r e a s o n a b l e l i k e l i h o o d of a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t , the 
harm, i f any , must be c o n s i d e r e d h a r m l e s s . S t a t e v . Tucker . 709 
P.2d 3 1 3 , 316 (Utah 1985) . 
Defendant f u r t h e r argues t h a t he was compel led t o 
t e s t i f y due t o the p r o s e c u t o r ' s comment. D e f e n d a n t ' s argument i s 
m e r i t l e s s . F i r s t , de fendant f a i l s t o show any p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t 
on the jury as a consequence of h i s t e s t i f y i n g . S e c o n d l y , a 
c u r a t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n t o the jury would have been s u f f i c i e n t t o 
remove any t a i n t i n the event defendant chose not t o t e s t i f y . 
See S t a t e v . H a l e s . 652 P.2d 1 2 9 0 , 1292 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . Thus, no 
p r e j u d i c i a l error can be a t t r i b u t e d t o the p r o s e c u t o r ' s conunent. 
E. NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRING 
REVERSAL EXISTS. 
1 . Because The A l l e g e d N o n - d i s c l o s e d 
Excu lpatory Witness Testimony Was 
Admitted At T r i a l , And Because Defendant 
Only S p e c u l a t e s That There May Be 
A d d i t i o n a l N o n - d i s c l o s e d Excu lpatory 
Ev idence , Defendant F a i l s To Show P r e j u d i c e . 
Defendant compla ins t h a t the p r o s e c u t i o n f a i l e d t o 
d i s c l o s e t r a n s c r i p t s of grand jury t e s t i m o n y which was p e r c e i v e d 
by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l as e x c u l p a t o r y . He f u r t h e r compla ins t h a t 
t h e r e may be a d d i t i o n a l e x c u l p a t o r y e v i d e n c e which was not 
d i s c l o s e d by the p r o s e c u t i o n . D e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m must f a i l for 
l a c k of p r e j u d i c e . 
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Prior to trial, the court ordered the prosecution to 
supply defendant with copies of grand jury transcripts pertaining 
to the case (R. 117). During trial, it was discovered that there 
were additional transcripts not disclosed by the prosecutor which 
defense counsel believed were exculpatory (R. 537 at pp. 1037-
38). Notably, defendant admits in his brief that he had the 
opportunity to call the alleged nondisclosed witnesses at trial. 
Under these facts, defendant is bankrupt to claim that 
he was prejudiced in any way by the alleged nondisclosure. In 
fact, defendant fails to allege on appeal any prejudicial harm 
which was not alleviated by the full disclosure at trial. 
Accordingly, defendant's claim cannot be considered reversible 
error. See Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30(a) (1982). 
Defendant additionally complains that since there were 
three allegedly non-disclosed witnesses, there may be further 
undisclosed evidence. Defendant's argument is purely 
speculative. Speculative and unknown discovery violations cannot 
be grounds for reversible error. 
2. Defendant Fails To Support His Claim 
Of Cumulative Error. 
Defendant argues that the alleged misconduct, taken as 
a whole, constitutes cumulative error sufficient to justify 
reversal. Defendant merely recites, in summary, his previous 
arguments and concludes that enough error must exist to require 
reversal. 
Again, defendant claims error without the support of 
legal analysis or authority. Accordingly, this Court should not 
consider defendant's unsupported claims. State v. Amicone* 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT, 
Defendant claims that the jury was exposed to an 
improper outside influence by the fact that some members of the 
jury engaged in prayer. He further claims that at least two 
jurors were pressured to vote for conviction as a result of the 
entrenched position of other jurors and a misunderstanding of the 
hung jury instruction. Defendant's claims are erroneous. 
Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence1 renders the 
testimony and affidavits of members of the jury inadmissible for 
the purpose of impeaching the jury verdict unless they are 
introduced to show that extraneous matters were improperly 
considered during jury deliberation. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that: 
evidence by a f f i d a v i t or testimony of a juror 
w i l l not be received to impeach or quest ion 
Rule 606(b) Utah R. Evid. reads as f o l l o w s : 
Inquiry in to v a l i d i t y of v e r d i c t or 
indictment. Upon an inquiry into the 
v a l i d i t y of a verd ic t or indictment f a juror 
may not t e s t i f y as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the j u r y ' s 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s or to the e f f e c t of anything 
upon h i s or any other j u r o r ' s mind or 
emotions as inf luencing him to assent to or 
d i s s e n t from the verd ic t or indictment or 
concerning h i s mental processes in connection 
therewith, except that a juror may t e s t i f y on 
the quest ion whether extraneous pre jud ic ia l 
information was improperly brought to the 
j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n or whether any outs ide 
inf luence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror. Nor may h i s a f f i d a v i t or evidence 
of any statement by him concerning a matter 
about which he would be precluded from 
t e s t i f y i n g be received for these purposes. 
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the jury verdict or to show the grounds upon 
which i t was tendered, or to show their 
misunderstanding of fact or law, or that they 
misunderstood the charge of the court , or the 
e f f e c t of the ir v e r d i c t , or the ir opinions , 
surmises and processes of reasoning in 
arriving a t a v e r d i c t . 
State v . Gee. 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (1972) . 2 Thus, 
defendant's attempt to impeach the j u r y ' s verd ic t was 
impermissible without a showing of extraneous prejudic ia l 
information or outs ide in f luence . 
Defendant further argues that the jury members were 
exposed to an "outside influence, 1! namely, God. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , 
for t h i s Court to consider defendant's claim of "outside 
in f luence ' would be to j u d i c i a l l y determine the ex i s tence of 
God—a theo log ica l quest ion c l e a r l y proscribed by the Utah 
Supreme Court. State v. Laf fer ty , 749 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Utah 
1988) . Addi t ional ly , the Utah Supreme Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y 
held that "prayer and supposed responses to prayer are not 
included within the meaning of the words 'outs ide in f luence . '" 
State v. DeMille. 83 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 , 8 (Ut. Sup. Ct. f i l e d May 
26 , 1988) . Accordingly, the Court ruled that Rule 606(b) 
precluded a defendant's attempt to claim that a juror was adverse 
af fected by h i s or her r e l i g i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s . I d . at 8. 
Therefore, defendant's claim that the t r i a l court erred in 
refusing to admit the juror affidavits is erroneous. 
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence notes that Rule 606(b) is verbatim the federal rule and 
comports with former Rule 41 and 44, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), and Utah case law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 
662 (1972). 
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Likewise, defendant's attempt to impeach the verdict 
due to a juror's misunderstanding of the "hung jury* instruction 
is similarly erroneous. As noted earlier, the Utah Supreme Court 
has clearly held that it is improper for impeachment purposes to 
allege juror misunderstanding of fact or law. State v. Gee, 28 
Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (1972). It is further improper 
to expose the inner pressures inherent in jury deliberations, 
id. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the testimony and 
affidavits were inadmissible to impeach the jury verdict and 
properly denied defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
Defendant also claims that misconduct occurred when the 
court allowed the jury to receive a dictionary during 
deliberations. This Court has ruled that a dictionary is 
"extraneous information" for purposes of impeachment under Rule 
606(b) Utah Rules of Evidence. Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 
305 (Utah App. 1987). However, defendant cites no record 
evidence in support of his factual allegation that a dictionary 
was present in the jury room. State v. Bingham. 684 P.2d 43, 46 
(Utah 1984) ("This court cannot rule on matters outside the trial 
record."). Neither does defendant establish by juror affidavit 
or other record evidence whether the dictionary was actually used 
or in what manner it was used. Rather, defendant simply infers 
that silence is prejudice. In the absence of record evidence to 
the contrary, this Court should assume the correctness of the 
judgment below. State v. Tucker. 657 P*2d 755, 757 (Utah 1982). 
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POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS, 
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial to support his conviction. A review 
of the evidence, however, reveals that defendant's claim is 
without merit* 
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v. Booker. 
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that where a defendant claims the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the standard 
of review is narrow. 
*[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State 
Vt Petreer Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); 
accord State v. McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 
942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the 
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. "It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. . . .M State v» Lamm, Utah, 606 
P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. • • . 
Id* at 345 (emphasis in original) . 
Defendant was convicted of the offenses of Tampering 
with Witness and O f f i c i a l Misconduct which provide as f o l l o w s : 
Tampering with witness—Retaliation 
against witness or informant—Bribery—A 
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person is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted/ he attempts to induce or 
otherwise cause a person to: 
(b) Withhold any testimony/ 
information document or thing . • . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-508 (1978). 
Official misconduct—Unauthorized acts or 
failure of duty—A public servant is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor ifr with an intent 
to benefit himself or another or to harm 
another/ he knowingly commits an unauthorized 
act which purports to be an act of his 
officef or knowingly refrains from performing 
a duty imposed on him by law or clearly 
inherent in the nature of his office. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-201 (1978). 
Thus/ the elements of Tampering With a Witness are that 
a person/ (1) believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted/ (2) he 
knowingly or intentionally attempts to induce or otherwise cause 
a person/ (3) to withhold any testimony information/ document/ or 
thing. Further/ the elements of Official Misconduct are that (1) 
a public servant/ (2) with an intent to benefit himself or 
another or to harm another/ (3) knowingly commits an unauthorized 
act which purports to be an act of his office/ or (4) knowingly 
refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law or clearly 
inherent in the nature of his office. 
A review of the evidence reveals that sworn testimony 
and documentary evidence was offered at trial to establish each 
and every element of the offenses for which defendant was 
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convicted. Defendant himself t e s t i f i e d tha t he and Olin Yearby 
conducted an o f f i c i a l inves t iga t ion as inves t iga to r s for the Sal t 
Lake County Attorney 's Office in to the cause and or ig in of the 
Fashion Place Professional Plaza f i r e (R. 532 a t 1233). As a 
r e s u l t of the inves t iga t ion , defendant prepared a seven-page 
repor t s e t t i ng forth the inves t iga t ive action taken, the 
information obtained, and the suspected or igin of the f i r e (R. 
532 at p . 1242) ( S t a t e ' s Exhibit 8) . Defendant submitted the 
or ig inal report to Harraan for approval and gave a courtesy copy 
to Dean Larsen, Murray City Fire Marshall (R. 259 at p . 137; R. 
532 at p. 1254) . After reviewing the repor t , Harman cal led 
defendant in to his office and ordered defendant to wri te a 
s u b s t i t u t e repor t (R. 529 at pp. 146-47) 
At t r i a l and before the grand ju ry , defendant t e s t i f i e d 
tha t Harraan re jected the seven-page repor t because i t made the 
county "look bad" and " l i ab le" (R. 530 at p . 44, R. 532 a t 1246). 
Harman wanted a more concise "shor t , " "one-page" repor t without a 
conclusion and which simply referred to Ashby's favorable repor t 
(R. 532 at p. 1246) . 
Soon the rea f t e r , defendant telephoned Larsen and told 
him tha t Harman was angry about the content of the r epo r t , was 
concerned tha t i t could cost the county mil l ions of d o l l a r s , and 
wanted the repor t destroyed (R. 535 at p . 91, R. 532 a t p . 1256). 
Defendant told Larsen to "dest roy," "get r id of," "paper the 
walls with," " ea t , " and "deep s i x , " the r epor t . I £ . Defendant 
explained t h a t Harman believed defendant and Larsen to be too 
close of f r iends and that defendant wrote the repor t to bols ter 
Larsen fs theory of the f i r e (R. 535 p . 919). 
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On August 25 , 1983, defendant submitted a one-page 
report excluding any opinions as to the f i r e or ig in and simply 
referr ing to Ashby's report ( S t a t e ' s Exhibit 7) (See Appendix 
"B"). The report was quickly approved, signed by Harman, and 
placed in the County Attorney's master f i l e , thus c los ing the 
case (R. 536 at pp. 752-53) . 
About November of 1985, defendant spoke with John 
Harrington, a reporter for Channel Four News, and to ld Harrington 
that Harman had ordered the report to be "shit canned," "deep 
s ixed ," or "shredded - because i t made the County look bad (R. 530 
at pp. 14 , 16 , 19 and 2 9 ) . Defendant told Harrington that Harman 
ordered him to commit a fe lony (R. 530 at p. 1 7 ) . Defendant said 
that he had never done anything dishonest before in h i s l i f e and 
that he f e l t he had sold out to Harman and the other crooks in 
the County Attorney's Office (R. 530 at p. 2 1 ) . 
Based upon the foregoing evidence, a jury could have 
reasonably concluded that defendant, be l i ev ing that an o f f i c i a l 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n or proceeding was pending or about to be 
i n s t i t u t e d , knowingly and i n t e n t i o n a l l y attempted to induce Dean 
Larsen to withhold defendant's seven-page i n v e s t i g a t i v e report . 
The jury could have further found that defendant, as a publ ic 
servant , intended to benef i t himself or another or to harm 
another, when he knowingly committed an unauthorized act which 
purported to be an act of h i s o f f i c e by attempting to induce Dean 
Larsen to withhold the seven-page report . Thus, the evidence was 
s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h the r e q u i s i t e elements of the o f fense . 
- 4 4 -
Defendant appears to further argue that the evidence 
was insufficient because some evidence, if believed, tends to 
show that defendant did not commit the offenses. In making his 
argument, defendant ignores the fundamental principle that a 
jury's belief or disbelief of a defendant's theory of a crime is 
a matter within the jury's exclusive prerogative to weigh the 
credibility of the witness testimony. State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 
229 (Utah 1980); EFCO Distributing. Inc.. v. Perrin. 17 Utah 2d 
375, 412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966) . The basic function of the jury is 
to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions therefrom. 
State v. Pierce. 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986). Despite testimony to 
the contrary, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that defendant committed the offenses of which he was 
convicted State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
POINT VI 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL ON A 
THEORY OF CUMULATIVE ERROR. 
Defendant requests that this Court reverse his 
convictions on the basis of either individually prejudicial or 
cumulative error. Based on the foregoing discussion of 
defendants allegations of error, reversal of his conviction is 
not warranted on the basis of any individual error or on a theory 
of cumulative error. Because the trial court, at most, committed 
harmless error, defendant's convictions should be affirmed. See 
State v. Bishop. 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 38 (Utah Sup. Ct., filed 
February 3, 1988); Hawkes v. State. 644 P.2d 111, 113 (Okl. Cr. 
1982); State V» McKenzie, 608 P.2d 428, 448, ££jLt. d£lli£d, 449 
U.S. 1050 (1980); United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1304 (8th 
Cir. 1978), ££Ut. d£ni£d, 439 U.S. 958. 
-45-
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Respondent 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. , 
DATED t h i s y l A ^ d a y of June , 19 88 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General /? 
_ ^ f c ^ ^ ^ ^ — 
DAN R. LARS EN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Loni F. DeLand and Scott W. Reed, attorneys for appellant, 132 
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C a s e : A s s i s t n • L. a I L !, a! I i I •„ '" t 111 , i I I! * , 1 ] !' 11 
F i r e , l o c a t e 1 at Fash io r r ?ce P r o f e s s i o n a l 
T M . r i ' '"!' "i c ««r|. •« (i In M u r r a v , H rah fihlO1 
Date nl I i i r Nun day , I .*.. " .il '" . I. 
i< *' ' ^ > * * *. .'i responding engi* » v ,i i^:*on 
located on 6100 South uitr * * <;* nf State Ftrc-
Can * 
t h e b u i l d i n - The f i r* he S o u t h s i c k < ; t a g m p was 
I - c t i n g ,h i r f i 
i l g n t e r s **.. i ^ 
i n t o t h e b u i l d i n g and u I l they cou ld f i n ^ was smoke no:. , i o : of 
il"" ' i"if nil in i ii « iiVed "i iir.d went d o w n s t a i r s , ~roke ou t 
i 1 in i i is door s and found t h e same us l i s t e d a b o v e , 
F i r e f i g h t e r s umini m\HVk i11if and t r l e d t o f i n d t h e 
mi ii! mi MI in in in IIII i in mi mi ililt I  PI! flu i oof was s o f t nnrl spunky. 
The s e c o n d engini- H i i l v e d liom l i t a l l o i . ,' s t a g e d
 Lu «>v M ii,j M 
of b u i l d i n g i i e n p i n r a r r i v e d and s t a g e d on t h e N o r t h s i d e of 
b u i l d i n g . ll« in ii i in i , i « i i l l IIIIII, North 
The wind was from t h e South t r a r e l i n p , h lu l< m i l e s pei hour on nun 
: i n g 
-a* i l H V E, ST IC ATORSSIGNA TI (R E D A T F APPROVED SY 
* " £ > ^ 
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partici il at morni ng 1 1 le ma jori ty of smoke was omitting from the 
eaves on the structure, directly ab on re DR JOEI COLBERXSONVS 
office, East of the West entrance of tl ie l:>i n 1 di ng on tl ie ¥ 
1 "t il s i s tl ie pi i mar y entrance into the 2nd floor of the Sal i ...nrt; 
Men t a1 Hea11 h area. 
At t l ii s poi i i t , a f o u r t h al arm was ca l l e d I n. arid 
W e s t s i d e of t h e b u i l d i n g , a d j a c e n t t o 300 East:, 1 1 HE f i i E II.HI broke* 
t l irough and was coining oi i t t h e "Westside a r e a by t l ie t i me ol a n . -^ i 
of Mi d v i fa 1 e I: i r e Depar tmei it A t appr oxl m a t e l y t h i s same t i me e n t r a n e e 
was made by Murray F i r e f i g h t e r s i n t o t h e West door oi I t l ie N 
wl ii cf i makes exitr> di r e c t 1 y i Tito t h e Sal t I ,ake County Men ta l ri* : 
made i n t o t h e h a l l w a y , STRATEN c o u l d f e e l "heat an A u I I in 
j «H i i i d i " J i fnced P^uf* "M" > t h e h a l l w a y tha r r u n s 
inbetween DIL JOCL C0LBLR1SUN " I . . i .i. ' l T uff^ 
Hraf was t o o i n t e n s e a t t h i s p o i n t , and f i r e l i g h t e r SI R« i J I 
iron" UII L.-LJ i. ,i " i r oo f was g e t t i n g v e r y spongy which 
c r e a t e d dann 1 • i l i n l i f l lu ' i , , to he msiAv " , ,«l r i ' " i t 
f rid been oil Lhe r o o f were a l s o a d v i s e d tu r e t r e a t o f f t h e r o o f . 
T ' - """ i ^in-ldinf ifi t h e N o r t h s i d e by 
cray F i r e , wt" ' t h r o u g h i\w winflow ' 11 I ^ K P T * = ; * I K J (i 
The1 t h e roof c o l l a p s e d w a t e r wa;i j \ ' n"c t h e w a l l s i i . t . "he 
m a i n - t i d y area m i - i I H N I n f 1 h JOFi H I BEPTSON s S 
o f f i c e , running d i r e c t l y South pi t D t i h lAV'IN . and DONNA L-AH• '^' 
c f l ' i ' -I hand drawn d i a g r a m a t t a c h e d tc
 A | i r T h i s was t h e c e n t e r 
of a r e a ui t i i i } 
Va i r!1?r.O 
The roof ( i I 1*ii i | in mi n mo t ints nl w a t e r 
% v mi i •• ' • c e n t e r ut i'i r t If . J S di t e r m i n e d at ! L u 
p o i n t , t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a i a r e a was t o t a l lv ilamappil mi 
' o v e r a b l e n ^ d ' o r SH * , j l l l • t 1 i^ ' i ' • • <. f hi M moved the i i 
i i in i i i in Lasii dud We.st a r e a s uf i hf b m l d i n p , tn M 
"1 c o n t a i n and save r e m a i n d e r , A' f i n h r h i nr I M I i 
d i r e c t e d rm^i '" l In I .i i MUM nl l ne b u i l d i n g , t h e a r e a 
i i ' i :DJJL" ami Ut»sl of UMNIJ/ LARS1N1' o f f i c e , which b e l o r p s 
L J <I DR SMITH i n n t i s f H T T i t rn 'd i nv < iid i MI ifi i j pp i j x i m a t e l y 
lu i n c h e s ' ' . i v 1 ! . " " , I h e x i t e d t h e b u i l d i n g s t r a i g h t 
up ^ f * ti, > i" i !'oximat e 1 v two oi t b r e p hundred f e e t , la1.'* I T , 
Nor th cf t h e h*il Id inp *T ' h iirii \ • i i ' IJ i i u . i m a t i i v J h i i 
from 11 I i in 11 in L rn "he same p r o x i m i t y of DR. SMITH'S o f f i c e 
where Lhe N i t r o / d i o x y i d e ua;«» l o c a t e d , wore f wn inni i HMM m 
oxvpen of tin1 • nmr dinnim nun i
 111 i.."ii m a s s i v e a d d i t i o n a l 
. ii - ' i o I ij a p r i m a r y r e a s o n fui r i d d i t i o n a l e x t e n s i v e 
damages m thic< p a r t i c u l a r a r e a . 
' . i l s t i I II i . d i r e c t l y above EDITH JAVENfS o f f i c e 
a r e t h e , uo i j o i s t s • i n ing E a s t and West t h r o u g h the h i r*1 
* * * " l d m , h a c e n t fu fhest li 111 • I w\ i 'n i il^i n c o n d u i t 
e l e r * M a i ga s p i p e l ine*. When t in roi f c o l l a p s e d 
i \g u n i t , whict wns r" t h e roo f , "d)fne^> •* s 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y w i « n li i " " < - , > ' i M; I i, l u I PI f ,J 
JAVEN1 ' " "* , < n.i i ui i\\ yfii> 1 In**s w n i r ai t u r e d and brokrf 
and bent down n fi < x\w a r e a , '.up, t o f" • I ' i, .u . i. « I i 
a r e a . Unknown v\\v\ r it i ml m in Inn i i d i n g was shut c 
S; .. . . i o i . 1 . [ iir c e n t r a l r o o ! c o l l a p s e d , t h i s Area was 
abandoned t o f r e e b u r n . The f i r e c o n t i n u e d i 
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an d un'h amp e r e d for a pp r ox ima t e 1 y on e (111 ) h o ur , w 1 11 1 IE f i i e f i gb t In g 
effort s were direct ed t owards t he E as t a i • i Wes t ends of t he 
1: " :i:i Ill :1::I i l g . 
(3x1, Ma] r 2 ]| 983 t h e day fo l 1 owing the f i re , , t h i s 
Inves t iga tox and SGT 01 IN YEARBY, frc >n i t .1 ic i Coi inty A t t o r n e y ' s 
I f R S 01 1 ::i i I a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e c a u s e o f 11 i e f I i e - : a 11 e n 11 o n w a s 
d i r e c t e d towards a space h e a t e r and e x t e n t i o n core ..... MR. JOEL 
II H l .nMiN I I i I e . 
The f o l l o w i n g i s a l i s t of i f ems s e n t t o A T ID 
CONSULTING ENGINEERING 1NCQRP0PA1FD 10810 Composi t D r i v e , I) i I 1 as 
T e x a s 71JJJU Area codi - i i Mi I / f I I In t i il i ins w i r e «-tiil l n r 
e x p e r t e x a m i n a t i o n by i I I i M.M0H', employed by f hi above f i nn 
d' vi i 1 iiini i f | .in i h e a t e r was f hi c«iui i i ( f i n lllln fi 1 lm inn 
i t ems w t r e sa i l . 
Il i1! ill i n - f i r e damaged e l e c t r i c s p a c e h e a t e r , t h e same 
I* i in ill iirnl f v|i i in in I 11 in 111 HI 11 
F i r e damaged space h e a t e r , 
I Small burned e l e c t r i c a l e x t e n t i o n cord . 
in II I  mi i I mi i i in I  in ui i i 11II in i . i I . 
* nil piece of i in 11 I electrical parallel 1 anij rrrrl 
apparently cllhri Rervinp as m 1 niniji oi hume unknown appliance. 
Ill II II I f i l l I III 1 f I I I 1 lli.H I III h I I I I I HI II II L i I III " I I1 "I III I I I 
Chief DEAN LARSON. 
Ml"! .l ill. GILMORE'S • : .onclusiox i wtts «s ±v 
Bati i ill on our exatnii nat ion, we h«w> fmm „ l e i a t e d 
evidence t h a t WOT i"l d i n d i c a t e the e x i s t e n c e ol! an e l e c t r i c a l faul t 
I i i g c c i i :! ill t ill c i it c i in m it;;; 11 II I II i i" II i • i I i i m 111 1 1 1 > 1 1 1 In 1 1 1 i" • i i cords 
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submit Led I mi t he r» we have lound no e v i d e n c e t h a t would s u p p o r t t h e 
con ten t i c ' ' I* « I n t i n a 1 h e a t e r , c lock r a d i c . ' lamp wa^ 
I III i ii 1 in i i in II III mi 1 1 1 i ) » i ' in i l l mi II III I n i III in in in in i i II I l i i II in i t 1 I n i i i l l in II III 
ri t ioii i ' i ' i| p l y i n g a t l e c l r i c a l power tn n lnmp, 
space h e a t e r and rlocl-t l a d i o i s b e i n g used in env i ronment come 
I I i i I i i j i i I I i i i i i mi in I i in i in i i i 
t e m p e r a t u r e c o n d i t i o n n e s u l t i n g damage t o t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n ami 
u l t i m a t e l y a f i r e However, m i c r o s c o p i c e x a m i n a t i o n o l t h e s t r a n d e d 
LI mlu, i i i 1 , I i i i i i i i n< i iiJenic t ha t f In s e x t e n t ion cord was 
e l e c t r i c a l l y e n e r g i z e d at III l i unit ol I he f i r e lf 
I III II " | I I I I I I III M i l l I I I f i l l III II I I I II III I ' l l I i l l II I I 1 I I 
f J r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y urn week a t t e i b e i n g a s s i g n e d C o n s e q u e n t l y 
an e x t e n s i v e and f u l l i n v e s t i g a t i o n was n e v e r ronsumated b»> t h i s 
A y c i II I II II i II i i i II I i II 1 1 II II II II i 1 1 i II il i II i ] | i 1 1 1 1 1 II i 1 1 ( [ « i I i 1 1 1 I 
s e v e r a l mi s i e n e walk f h r o u g h s , and dip <l >wn oil t h e a r e a , i I 
Bit. JOEL COLP-ERTSON'S o f f i c e a r e a* f o l l o w s 
I In I I | i nun I i ill I I i i I  i I II i i I I O L B E R I S ( M 
o f f i c e , P a r t i c u l a r l y t h e Southwest c o r n e r , Reasons #1 lln 
I I en s i ve low h e i t ( f l o o r l e v e l ) on b r i ck W«J I I JI I ' *ff 
b r i c t k a l i , g u t s i J l i e t. L I > tiuwn t o a r e a ol me ta l t i l t i al i 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y Irt i n c h e s s q u a r e Also lln V p a t t e r n on M 
cab in r? d i r e c t s i i M I I i I I 111 m in i i I II II H i II MIII 
on I In Mi i I hwest corner against, the wall, was totally consumed I he 
only recogni/i nl It remainder heiiip apy-i ox imat ely 1 t 1 l/i inches 
i l l III III III III 1 ( i i III III l i III III I N I II II Ill 1 |l 1 I III I I l l III III II l n i l | i l 11 i i l l I III III) H I III I I I I II II 
o r i g i n a t e d lii Southwest c o r n e i , c r e p t up w a l l , ronsmxied t h e bookcase 
above Llie uicLul l i l t c a b i n e t , f e l l down i n t o t h i s a r e a and c o n t i n u e d 
Case dJJ iU 
c l i m b i n g t h i W'V <- 1 .MI I! Il I o o b t a i n t h e H 11* f o t h e E a s t , w h e r e t h e 
mi in I mi 1  ill in mi i in i I  i; 111 in I I li mi in i I mi 11 Men it ill A I i mi i |i W( s I i! in I I  I  li in mi mi I mi 11 I 
u p Hill11! L a s i H t l j a t e u t i n l I n s kit s t w a l l W i i s n li i t:kj - a - w a y L P M . e 
s p r i n g s w e r e t o t a l l y a n n e a l e d O I I t h e e m u li A l l i t r n i 1 ntm Wi il 
I I'll till II I I II I I I I II II II Ml I II III Il I 1 I ,i II I I > I J] I I I i l l 111 II II I I III ' I ' l l i n ( I I II I I , I ( i ( I I, i | 1 i (I (| L I I J ' 
the wall,, burning the metal grids holding Lhr file rnoi covering the 
false ceiling. Thir arp.'i becoming super heated, to the prunL where 
Hii'i' i ,tj I s 1. r u i; I1 HI i < i I 111 J i 11 li. ,i J i.1,, I ii" 1 I a". oi 11 ]»i c i e In I I it t J o o r a r e a . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h i j c a r p e t n o t d e s t r o y e d u n t i l vim g e t i n i n t h e d o o r 
e n t r , nrva The firv mil inn nn I In I i I i i run liniu ulit II I I i | | i il 
on uiu. l i p p e d l i l t Lht f l i t i d l i n g w o u l d hi 1 nn ( ' l i p p i n g m e a n i n g , 
s t a y s h o o k i n g t i l e f o m e t a l s t r u c t w r t I In i. i i i in if i n p l a c e i n 
f I i i I 11 f i i I I I  i I > I mi I I i 1 I I I i I 111 I in I i I 11 in 111 11 in in 11 i I II11 I . i I i i I in I  i I 11 
a n d r a p i d l y s p r e a d t h r o u g h c . t h e b u i l d i n g , ] ' a p p e a r s i f , / 1" i • i 
d r a f t s w e r e i n l c o n s t a n t a n d i n c o n t i n u a l i t v w i t h w a l l s i n f a l s e 
I II 1 III I 1 4 i l l I II i l l III III III I I . Ill III I I III III III I III I III I II I I . II III I III III III I ' l l I II | < I 1 I I 
c o u l d f i n d a 1 r a n d f u e I 1 o a d . 
Il lii ,>ii e a r h n t . w a s EDITH J A V F N ' S a m i PONIM L A P S n ? ] " " 
n I t 1 c i" h p a u . i , Wii> s o n i f u n j i ' m o r e b u r n e d i i i . j n m i l i n i H h K J M i N u M i c e . 
T h e r e a s o n s fun f l i i " n i l T h i f i r e w a s m l l o w e i l t o b u r n f r e e l y f o r a t 
l e a ? f in i« I  I JAVENS '. U F RON'S a n d HI1 SMITH' I I I 
LULBLklbUN I u i i i c e w a s m, I iiiin , il in, had! 1 ) I  mi 1 1 I ui .4. st a t e d b e f o r e , 
t h e f i r s t WM I 1 liiifii b u i l d i n g vu I l l u n u f l i 101 I COI.RERTSON'S w i n d o w a n d 
III rill 11 III I I III Nil M f I I I II i l l INI III III II I'll 11 f 11 II I I I || III II II IIP I f |> II I III II I I I |. Il 1II II II I I I I 1 4 1 i l l III.. I l l I I I II II1 , 
Consequently, il his Agent, feels thai DR. I OLBERTSON' IS office may have 
been virtually burned out prior fo wafri entering, and/or fir** 
ill 11 (J < i i i 1 n i l mi II in II mi I  II II II II l i II Ml I in I I I I in 1 in mi in I in in 1 I  11 mi I  ill in in |i I 1 mi mi 1 I e 
11 M ' 1 I  iwnf. tl I » Vi I I v r i " ( 1 I O h I C O L B E R T S O N 1 S n M i c e , m e a n i n g DR 
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C a s e 8'SIbO 
COLBERTSON1 S o f f i ce s u s t a i n e d s i i b s t a n t i a l hea t for a 1 arger 
p f i" i 11» 11 I"! f l 1 !Ti€ 1 1 i€ • c 'i , II > p ] a c c 1:1 i IE • f i i : IE • a c 1 1 l a 1 ] y 1: >i o! :IE t: i 
iiniivi's t h e m s e l v e s , was where 13E COLBER' I SOI I S o f f i c e "W est 
a dj o in s L O1 11 c • ou t s i de Nor th wa 11 o f s 11 u : t \ 11: e . 
' I I i:i s Agei it c :: : iseqii lei i t ] ;; p Il ac es till: IIE c -z I gd i I I i i 
Southwest corner, JC El CC I BERTSONf S office, cause unknown. 
Attached to repor t are the Murray City Fire Department 
i in i ili in il r t 1 p i i in i  .. , 
EXHIBIT B 
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0" tNSt AS«*0«T |D 
Fire 
CODE VIOLATION DATE ABORTED DATE OCCURRED CASE NUMBER 
83250 
OUTSIDE AGENCY ft CASE NUMBER 
COMPLAINANT ADDRESS RESIDENCE PMQNE BUSINESS PMONE 
AODlTlONAL INFORMATION ft SYNOPSIS 
AUGUST 25, 1983 
Case: Assist in Salt Lake County Mental Health Fire 
Fashion Place Professional Plaza 
6065 South 300 East, Murray, Utah 64107 
Date of fire: Sunday, May 1, 1983 at 0452 hours. 
••**********************************^ 
This Investigator arrived to assist Murray Fire on 
Monday, May 2, 1983. I assisted in the process of digging thru 
DR. COLBERTSON'S office that day. 
On May 4th, an outside Investigator was hired by 
\ 
V 
Salt Lake County. It was at this time that I was removed from 
the case to prevent duplication of investigative efforts. 
No further action. 
